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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the potential for low-cost airlines in Asia. Low-
cost airlines have been very successful in North America and Europe and have
significantly impacted the airline industry and its stakeholders. In what ways and to
what extent this might be repeatable in Asia is the underlying question of this thesis.
An investigation of the low-cost airline business model reveals that there are a
number of key elements that make it so successful on both sides of the Atlantic. But
what works in North America and Europe may not be feasible in Asia. An analysis of
the Asian airline industry shows that it differs from the rest of the world in several
important dimensions, which will substantially affect prospective low-cost airlines. On
the one hand, the rigid regulatory frameworks in most parts of Asia and the fact that
many traditional Asian airlines have some of the world's lowest unit costs may not
allow Asian low-cost airlines to thrive in the same way as they have in other parts of
the world. On the other hand, a breakdown of Asia's socioeconomic indicators shows
that the continent is bound to experience significant growth in intra-Asia air travel
over the coming years. The low-cost airline business in Asia is therefore challenging
in several ways but potentially very lucrative. The possible impacts that an increasing
presence of low-cost airlines in Asia would have on the various stakeholders in the
region are substantial. While some of these stakeholders will likely benefit from a
growing presence of low-cost airlines in Asia, others might have a lot to lose. This
thesis analyses several stakeholder groups and suggests potential response options.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter B. Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The low-cost airline model has been very successful in North America and
Europe. Today's low-cost airlines are among the most profitable airlines in the world
and the global equity markets value many low-cost airlines higher than established
airlines. In Asia, the market context is different and the model has not yet been
implemented on a large scale. Infrastructure and regulatory constraints may limit the
ability of low-cost airlines to exploit their distinct efficiencies. Most of the region's
dominant carriers are government controlled so the nature of competition among
airlines is different. This could potentially discourage the start-up of low-cost airlines
in Asia.
Asian airlines have to operate within the regulatory straightjackets of
numerous bilateral air service agreements. Most routes are dominated by major flag
carriers whose rights and profit-making ability are protected by their government
guardians. There are also major airport slot constraints at many Asian airports and in
many cases a lack of secondary airports. Potentially lucrative markets such as
Singapore or Hong Kong do not even have serviceable secondary airports within
their national boundaries.
However, there are currently a handful of airlines in Asia that operate based on
the low-cost airline model (e.g. AirAsia in Malaysia). And several independent low-
cost airlines are reported to be launched in the near future (e.g. ValuAir in
Singapore). Traditional Asian carriers feel that they could potentially lose passengers
to these new airlines. For this reason, some of these traditional airlines (e.g. Thai
Airways and Singapore Airlines) are considering setting-up their own "no frills"
subsidiaries as they have seen how the low-cost airline model changed the industry
in other parts of the world.
Several traditional airlines in North America and Europe are in severe trouble
or bankrupt, at least partly because of increased competition from low-cost airlines.
But not all lessons learned elsewhere are applicable to Asia. As this thesis will
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explain in Chapter 3, many established Asian airlines already have some of the
world's lowest unit costs. Low labor costs, long average passenger haul and the use
of large aircraft result in significant unit cost advantages. It is not clear if the low-cost
airline model can reduce these costs even further to pose a significant threat to
Asia's established airlines
However, the Asian airline industry will undoubtedly undergo major changes
within the next decade. Forecasts predict Asia-Pacific to account for 30% of world
RPK by 2020.1 That's up from 23% today, making it the largest market for air
transportation by that time. In what way low-cost airlines play a role in this is not yet
clear. However, the low-cost airline model does not come in a definite form and does
allow for regional adaptations. It might prove to be a powerful concept to make air
transportation more affordable and therefore to make this form of transportation
available to a larger percentage of the population. This could help developing a
sustainable aviation environment for the growing economies in the region.
1.2 Why LCA?
Since this new business model was introduced in the seventies by Herb
Kelleher of Southwest Airlines, people have struggled to come up with an appropriate
term for such airlines. I will use the term low-cost airline or its abreviation LCA
throughout this thesis. Most European low-cost airlines (e.g. EasyJet) define
themselves as such. Another popular term, especially in North America, is low-cost
carrier or LCC. LCA and LCC can be used interchangeably but for reasons of
consistency, I will exclusively use LCA in this thesis.
Other industry experts (e.g. Thomas C. Lawton, Imperial College, London UK)
use the definition low-fare airline or LFA. In my opinion, low fares is not what
distingishes an LCA from a traditional airline. In the airline industry, fares ted to be
market driven rather than cost driven. An established airline can match an LCA's
fares anytime in any market. A distinction based on fares does not seem to be
appropriate to me.
1 Airbus Global Market Forecast (2002)
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I will use the words traditional and established to describe airlines that do not
fall in the LCA category. Most these airlines have been in business for several
decades and their business model has very much shaped the airline industry as we
know it today.
Although established airline describes a wide range of airlines, it will be a
useful term to differentiate LCAs from non-LCAs. Sometimes I will refer to a specific
sub-group of established airlines. Charter airlines will be referrd to as airlines whose
main business is not to operate scheduled services and whose services are usually
sold in connection with a tour package. The term network airline will be used when an
airline uses the hub-and-spoke system and thus carries a substantial amount of
connecting passengers.
1.3 Structure and Purpose of this Thesis
In Chapter 2, this thesis will examine the low-cost airline model and identify its
key success factors. Examples from North America and Europe will serve as
examples for how the model works and in what different ways it has been
implemented. This chapter will also show the differences between low-cost airlines
and established airlines.
In Chapter 3, it will then go on and look closely at the Asian market context, its
geography and infrastructure. The chapter will examine how established Asian
airlines are different from airlines in North America and Europe. It will also analyze
the intra-Asian markets for air transportation (domestic and international) and look at
regulations and infrastructure constraints in these markets.
Chapter 4 will draw on Chapters 2 and 3 to evaluate the challenges and
opportunities that potential LCAs will encounter in Asia. Will Asian LCAs be able to
compete against traditional airlines in the region that have some of the world's lowest
unit costs? What are potential markets in Asia? What might limit the growth of LCAs
in Asia?
After evaluating the opportunities and challenges for low-cost airlines in Asia in
Chapter 4, Chapter 5 will discuss the implications this has on various stakeholders
13
and how they could possibly respond. The chapter will have a special focus on
traditional Asian carriers; how they are affected and what potential response options
they might choose.
The reader of this thesis will obtain an understanding of the low-cost airline
model as well as the Asian airline industry. The reader will be able to understand how
low-cost airlines work, what potential they have in Asia and what this all means for
established Asian carriers.
The thesis has a special focus on South East Asia. Most of the activities
concerning low-cost airlines in Asia have been centered around this region.
Furthermore, with ASEAN2, a powerful free-trade zone about to be built, it will likely
be the first sub-region to experience multilateral economic deregulation of
international air transportation. This might further encourage the rise of low-cost
airlines in this part of the world.
1.4 Key Findings
" The low-cost airline business model is very flexible and highly adaptable. Most
LCAs share a number of key elements that allow them to operate at a
significant lower cost structure than traditional airlines. Although the way LCAs
produce and distribute their services may differ from traditional airlines, LCAs
are still in the business of carrying passengers from A to B.
" Many established Asian airlines have some of the world's lowest unit costs.
Reasons include the lower input costs, the relatively long average stage-
lengths and the extensive use of wide-body aircraft. Asian LCAs will only enjoy
some of these cost advantages.
" Many domestic and international markets for air transportation in Asia are
highly regulated. The development towards a more liberal aviation
environment is slow, except for a few countries. Due to the absence of a
2 Association of South East Asian Nations (www.asean.org)
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powerful regional entity like the EU in Europe, Asia is not likely to see
significant multilateral liberalization of air transportation in the coming years.
" The Asian airline industry is significantly different from other parts of the world.
The success of the LCA business model in North America and Europe might
therefore not be repeatable in Asia to the same extent.
" From an economic perspective, many markets for air transportation in Asia are
attractive for any type of airline. Particularly the rapid economic growth and the
resulting increase in personal wealth make Asia an appealing region to
operate an airline.
" The experience made in North America and Europe suggests that if LCAs
were to succeed in Asia, the implications for the various stakeholders would
be very significant. While some stakeholder groups might benefit from an
increasing presence of LCAs in Asia, others might have a lot to lose.
15
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2. The Low-Cost Airline Model
2.1 Introduction
How can Ryanair regularly sell tickets from Dublin to London for under US$ 30
and still be Europe's most profitable airline? How can Southwest enjoy the industry's
highest customer satisfaction while providing one of the lowest service levels? How
can AirAsia be Asia's fastest growing airline without an airline manager at the top?
Traditional airline economics seem to be undergoing major changes. What
seemed indisputable a few years ago, is in doubt today. The LCA business model is
changing the face of the airline industry around the world. And established airlines
find it difficult to respond to this phenomenon.
But low-cost airlines are not a new thing. Southwest Airlines made its maiden
flight on June 18, 1971. More than 30 years later, there are now more than 30 low-
cost airlines spread across all 5 continents. In North America and in Europe where
LCAs have been in business longest, this had far-reaching consequences for
established airlines. While LCAs are posting record profits, established airlines
declare bankruptcies. In February 2003, Air Canada's CEO Robert Milton said: "(...)
the existing full-service network airline model is not sustainable without continued
fundamental change."3
There is no single type of low-cost airline. All of today's LCAs have their own
distinct characteristics. But at the same time, there are some basic principles that
most low-cost airline base their business on. Some of them are from within the airline
business, some of them are not. Although LCAs and established airlines are in the
same business, the way they do business is significantly different.
This chapter will examine the key elements of the LCA business model. It will
discuss different forms and also look at the failures. Most examples used in this
chapter will come from North America and Europe. The way this business model
could be adapted to the Asian market context will be discussed in Chapter 4.
17
3 On CBC News (www.cbc.ca)
2.2 Why Low-Cost?
Having low-costs enables an airline to charge lower fares. In nearly all
markets for goods and services, demand increases with lower prices. In the airline
industry, lower fares translate into an increased number of passengers. By carrying
large numbers of passengers, an airline is able to operate flights at high load factors
and therefore to make efficient use of its fleet and other assets. These efficiencies
turn into cost savings which again enables the airline to charge lower fares. The
following figure highlights this cycle.4
Lower Cost Lower Fares
More Passengers
Figure 1.1: Cycle of efficieny
However, the more efficient operations become, the more difficult it gets to
increase efficiency further. For airlines operating their flights at load factors in the
eighties and flying their aircraft 13 hours a day, it is difficult to further increase the
utilization of their produced capacity.
To obtain these high load factors, LCAs tend to cater to high volume markets.
But a market does not need to have high volumes at the beginning to be attractive to
an LCA. By offering lower fares than the airlines that currently serve a market, a low-
cost airline is able to stimulate additional demand and turn a low volume market into
a high volume market. Even when the market already has high volumes, it can
4 Cleared for Take-Off - Structure and Strategy in the Low Fare Airline Business, Thomas C. Lawton,
2002
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stimmulate demand. In the decade prior to Ryanair's launch, roughly 900,000 people
flew from Dublin to London each year.5 The previous growth rate was minuscule.
Last year, more than 4 million passengers flew from the Irish to the British capital.
The reason for this stimulation was mainly Ryainair's entry and the resulting
decrease in fares.
2.3 Defining Low-Cost Airlines
With regard to unit costs, many Asian carriers could be defined as low-cost
airlines compared to their US or European counterparts. Singapore Airlines' unit
costs are at USO 3.88 per ASK whereas British Airways operates at US 8.61.6
Although Singapore Airlines has relatively low unit costs, it is not a low-cost airline in
the sense that it is not using the LCA model. BA and SIA differ in wage levels, stage
lengths, average aircraft size etc., which translates into different unit costs. Still, both
airlines use the same business model and can be characterized as classic examples
of network carriers.
Also LCAs themselves struggle to define their business model. According to
EasyJet's strategic vision, the company is based on seven core principles:7
" Yield managed fares
" Modern and standardized fleet
* High aircraft utilization
* Short haul services
" No travel agents or tickets
" Point to point service
" No free food or drinks
5 Cleared for Take-Off - Structure and Strategy in the Low Fare Airline Business, Thomas C. Lawton,
2002
6 SIA and BA annual reports 2002
7 Cleared for Take-Off - Structure and Strategy in the Low Fare Airline Business, Thomas C. Lawton,
2002
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However, EasyJet's flights from London to Athens are 4 hours, which might be
too long to fall in the category "short haul". And with the acquisition of GO, the
standardized fleet is somewhat compromised, too. Also, if the company strictly
maximized aircraft utilization, it would not fly into congested airports such as Paris
(CDG) or Munich (MUC). And of course also most established airlines have "yield
managed fares". These seven principles alone are not what makes EasyJet an LCA.
In the case of Southwest, many people argue that the consumer and
employee oriented corporate culture is the major recipe of success.8 Again, this is
just part of the story and many of the arguments are specific to the case of
Southwest. Whereas Southwest openly considers its employees to be more
important than its customers, Ryanair's corporate culture has little to do with
considering the company as a big family. Ryanair therefore outsources all ground
staff except at its Dublin base which is something that would not be compatible with
Southwest's values.9 This makes clear that LCAs show substantial differences
among themselves and what is true for one might not apply to another. It is therefore
not possible to define an LCA in a complete and exhaustive manner. However, there
are some features that are very common among low-cost airlines. The following
catalogue is an attempt to list the things that low-cost airlines usually do.
" Fly short routes.
* Use secondary and/or uncongested airports.
* Carry a low number of connecting passengers.
" Operate flights at very high load factors.
" Do not schedule "banks" at their hubs.
* Sell tickets through own distribution channels, e.g. call centers and booking
engines on the airline's homepage.
" Do not issue paper tickets.
" Limit operations to one coherent economic region.
8 Nuts! Southwest Airlines' Crazy Recipe for Business and Personal Success, Kevin & Jackie
Freiberg, 1998
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" Offer only one class of travel with a relatively high seat density.
" Provide limited add-on services including (but not limited to) basic in-flight
amenities.
" Have a very simple fleet structure, often using just one type of aircraft.
" Have a high daily aircraft utilization.
" Have flexible work rules.
* Do not participate in global alliances.
" Do not market their cargo capacity.
" Are not government owned or government controlled.
An airline that strictly applies the LCA model will show most of these features.
Other airlines may use only parts of it or modify the model to some extent. JetBlue is
such an airline. Its product quality is higher than most other LCAs. In 2002, the
second year in a row, JetBlue won the Reader's Choice Award of Condd Nast for
best domestic airline. The airline also operates out of a primary airport (New York's
JFK) and offers flights with stage lengths longer than most classic LCAs. Hence, it is
difficult to classify airlines into LCAs and non-LCAs. There is a range of variations
between these two extremes. Appendix 1 shows which LCAs show which of the
above characteristics.
2.4 Key Elements
2.4.1 Network
2.4.1.1 Short Stage Lengths
The networks of most low-cost airlines predominately consist of short-haul
routes. This might surprise since short flights are inherently more expensive on a per-
kilometer basis than longer flights. This is because the labor-intensive and therefore
costlier time on the ground is spread over a shorter revenue generating distance in
9 Cleared for Take-Off - Structure and Strategy in the Low Fare Airline Business, Thomas C. Lawton,
2002
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the air. Passenger processing costs, landing fees etc. are largely independent of
stage length. This makes shorter trip more expensive on a per-kilometer basis.
So why should a low-cost airline favor short-haul flights if they result in higher
unit costs? The high unit costs of short-haul flights are compensated by high unit
revenues. On a per-kilometer basis, a US$59 restricted fare from Los Angeles to Las
Vegas on Southwest contributes more than a US$1,059 restricted fare from Los
Angeles to Sydney on Qantas.10 Short flights are costlier than longer flights but since
yields are higher too, that doesn't mean that they are less profitable.
Not only on the revenue side, also on the cost side short-haul flights are more
desirable for LCAs. Long flights have lower units cost than short flights. However, the
relative cost advantage between LCAs and established carriers diminishes with
increased stage length. The cost areas where LCAs have an advantage over
established carriers (distribution, ground handling etc.) make up a smaller percentage
of the total trip costs at longer stage lengths. LCAs will therefore lose some of their
cost advantage over established carriers if they expand into long-haul.
Also, the local OD demand for a long-haul service might not be sufficient
enough to break-even, so there would be a need to consolidate demand. However,
this is against the principles of the low-cost airline model which focuses on offering
point-to-point services. Furthermore, if low-cost airlines wanted to offer long-haul
flights, they would need to provide more in-flight services and as a consequence,
ground times would get longer due to catering support at the gate and additional
cabin cleaning requirements. This would decrease aircraft utilization, which an LCA
would hardly want to compromise. Finally, longer flights may cross international
boundaries, which would make the flight subject to bilateral agreements that may
significantly limit the freedoms enjoyed when operating domestically. Although some
low-cost airlines offer international services (e.g. EasyJet from London/UK to
Athens/Greece), they usually do so in a coherent economic region such as the
NAFTA or the EU.11
10 Fares quoted on southwest.com and travelocity.com for a 07MAR03 departure in economy class
1 North American Free Trade Agreement (USA, Canada and Mexico); European Union (Belgium,
Germany, France, Italy Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Greece,
Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Sweden)
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2.4.1.2 Focus on Services Within a Single Coherent Economic Region
International traffic is governed by bilateral agreements. These treaties may
limit international services to designated carriers, which are often the flag carriers of
the two nations involved. Many governments still highly protect their national airline
which makes entering these markets almost impossible.
Currently all flights of European low-cost airlines are within the EU, with the
exceptions of flights to the Czech Republic (Prague), Norway (Oslo) and Switzerland
(Zurich, Geneva). However, all these countries have very close ties to the EU. Also in
North America, there are only a few flights of LCAs that cross international
boundaries and if they do so, it is predominantly between the US and Canada, which
have signed an open-skies agreement and also have close economic and regulatory
ties. As of today, AirAsia and Virgin Blue fly domestically only.
The more coherent the markets, the more efficient and less risky are airline
operations. Although the EU facilitates international air transportation within its
boundaries, European LCAs have to operate in a far more heterogeneous
environment than their US counterparts. Ryanair flights are sold in more than ten
different languages and more than five different currencies. Southwest on the other
hand operates in an environment of one language and one currency. Operating in
different countries also means various labor agreements that need to be negotiated.
Finally, building a corporate culture becomes inherently more difficult if people speak
different languages and have different cultural backgrounds.
2.4.1.3 Focus City
A low-cost airline usually starts its operations out of one airport and gradually
adds new destinations out of this airport. For JetBlue it is New York's JFK and for
AirAsia it is Kuala Lumpur's KLIA. Their networks don't look much different from a
traditional hub-and-spoke network. Also Southwest, EasyJet and most other LCAs
started from one single airport. The reason behind this strategy is again efficient use
of assets (gates, ground staff, maintenance facilities etc.) at this airport. Once the
infrastructure at the base is in place, the incremental infrastructure and manpower
costs to add another flight is relatively small. This is the main reason for having an
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expanding focus city. It is not a means to consolidate demand and to offer connecting
itineraries. So although their networks look centralized, low-cost airlines are to a large
extent point-to-point carriers with regard to the traffic they carry. JetBlue and AirAsia
are still in the start-up phase and therefore have one major focus city. Southwest and
Ryanair, which have been in the business for quite some time now, have developed
networks with various focus cities. Southwest's current growth strategy is to "connect
the dots" which means to offer new non-stop services between existing destinations
as opposed to adding new destinations to the network.12 Adding and developing new
destinations is far more expensive and risky, so "connecting the dots" is a more
conservative, although limited, growth strategy.
2.4.1.4 Primary vs. Secondary Airports
Although based in London-Luton, EasyJet serves a number of primary airports
such as Paris (CDG) or Zurich (ZRH). The airline can sell tickets to/from these
convenient airports at a premium because of the airport's location and added
services (e.g. car rental agencies, duty free shops). However, these primary airports
also mean higher handling costs for the airline as well as costs resulting from
congestion at these airports (e.g. decreased aircraft utilization).
Furthermore, many of these primary airports are slot constrained, so it may be
difficult to obtain slots at favorable times during a day. Landing fees are another
major cost item for low-cost airlines, especially on a per-kilometer basis because their
strategy is to offer frequent departures and short stage lengths. Looking at the
airports in London (UK), the landing fees for a B737 are US$730 at Heathrow,
US$545 at Gatwick and US$310 at Stansted.13 Not surprisingly, Stansted has the
highest density of low-cost airline traffic.
Ryanair chooses to exclusively use secondary airports such as Hahn (124km
north of Frankfurt) or Charleroi (60km south of Brussels). For passengers, these
locations are more inconvenient, but Ryanair passes part of the cost savings
obtained by using these secondary airports on to its customers. By using secondary
12 Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 10, 2003
13 During peak times for aircraft with a MTOW of 50t or greater (BAA 2002 data)
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airports, it is also possible to get favorable arrangements with local authorities. At
Ryanair, airports are sometimes considered profit centers. The airport authority of the
Italian beach resort Rimini paid Ryanair US$600,000 a year to start flying to their
airport in 1998.14 This was US$10 per expected passenger. After two years, Rimini's
airport management changed and wanted to change the arrangement in its favor.
Ryanair refused and pulled out. The same has happened at other airports served by
Ryanair. The European Commission, acting on a complaint filed by a unknown
competitor, is now investigating the legality of the aid received by Ryanair.15
Interestingly enough, Ryanair CEO O'Leary was among the loudest to condemn the
way other airlines were supported by government aid.
2.4.1.5 In the Future: Long-Haul LCAs?
More recently, there is a trend among LCAs towards longer stage lengths.
Both JetBlue and Southwest offer transcontinental flights within the US. However,
these flights are still domestic, hence not subject to any bilateral agreements.
Furthermore, the airlines can use existing aircraft for these medium-haul flights. More
importantly, both airlines fly these transcontinental flights out of their focus cities
(New York and Baltimore/Phoenix respectively); hence some consolidation of
demand takes place at these locations in the form of passengers connecting to/from
other origins/destinations.
One reason for expanding into long-haul is increased aircraft utilization. Short-
haul operations have lower aircraft utilization rates than long-haul operations. Virgin
Atlantic, which only flies intercontinental routes, has a fleet-wide utilization rate of
13.4 hours.16 According to current CAA Statistics, this number is the highest among
all UK airlines, both LCAs and established airlines. The fact that Virgin Atlantic
operates long-haul flights only, is likely to be the main reason for this. This might
suggest that LCAs could increase aircraft utilization if they expand into long-haul
operations. This could potentially lower their unit costs even further. And the newer
versions of B737 aircraft can even be certified for trans-oceanic services. However,
14 No Frills, Simon Calder, 2002
15 The Guardian (UK), December 12, 2002
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for the reasons mentioned in chapter 2.4.1.1, LCAs continue to focus on short-to-
medium stage lengths at this point in time. Once these markets saturate, long-haul
services might be next chapter of the LCA success story.
2.4.2 Scheduling
2.4.2.1 Short Tumaround Times
From a financial point of view, the fleet is an airline's most valuable asset. High
aircraft utilization is therefore a key element in a low-cost operation and LCAs
therefore fly their aircraft more hours per day than established airlines. British
Airways is using its B737 fleet 7.0 hours per day while EasyJet is using its B737
aircraft 11.1 hours.17 In most cases, aircraft of LCAs spend between 15 and 25
minutes at the gate between two consecutive flights.18 The following example
highlights the impact of short turnaround times on an airline's costs. If Southwest had
to extend its ground times by as little as 10 minutes, the airline would have to buy an
additional 31 Boeing 737s at a cost of US$37 million each in order to be able to fly
the same schedule. 19
There are several reasons why low-cost airlines can turn their aircraft quicker
than traditional airlines. A "no frills" in-flight service requires little catering supplies on
the ground. Flights do not wait for delayed connecting passengers. Most low-cost
airlines do not carry cargo, which speeds up the loading and unloading processes.
The fact that passengers check-in fewer pieces of baggage on short-haul flights also
shortens the loading process. The use of uncongested secondary airports minimizes
the exposure to possible delays. Finally, fleet commonality also helps reducing the
time spent on the ground as the handling processes are standardized across flights.
Taxi time can be a substantial part of the total trip time, especially on short-
haul routes. Most low-cost airlines prefer gates that are at the far end of terminals or
at satellite terminals. These gates tend to be at good locations in terms of taxi time.
16 CAA Statistics
17 CAA Statistics
18 No Frills, Simon Calder, 2002
19 According to Colleen Barrett, President of Southwest Airlines (in No Frills, Simon Calder, 2002)
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When EasyJet started operations to/from Athens in Greece, the airline insisted on
being assigned gates at the airport's satellite terminal despite the inconvenience for
passengers in the form of long walking distances. This highlights again the focus of
LCAs on operational efficiencies rather than on offering premium services for their
customers.
2.4.2.2 High Frequencies?
On a given route, Southwest tends to offer a relatively high number of flights.
For 2002, the airline reported having operated 947,331 flights, serving 59 cites. This
translates into an average of 44 daily departures per city. However, many LCAs offer
significantly lower frequencies. EasyJet offers far fewer flights between its cities
because it flies many low-density routes that do not support a high number of flights
each day. That's why EasyJet destinations saw an average of 7 daily departures in
2002.
The different strategies of Southwest and EasyJet show that frequency is not a
key to success in the LCA world. What is important is high aircraft utilization, which
both Southwest and EasyJet report. But high aircraft utilization does not necessarily
require high frequencies.
2.4.2.3 Disregard Connecting Passengers
Unlike hub-and-spoke carriers, low-cost airlines do not explicitly schedule
banks for short connections at their focus cities as this would increase the potential
for delays and decrease aircraft utilization. However, this doesn't mean that there are
no connecting passengers on board of low cost airlines flights. According to the
company, almost 30% of Southwest's customers were connecting passengers in
2001. On the other hand, Ryanair does not allow passenger to book itineraries with
connections. The two trips need to be booked as two individual itineraries. Ryanair
neither guarantees connections nor offers through-fares. 20 Also, baggage is not
transferred from one Ryanair flight to another Ryanair flight.
2 A through-fare considers a connecting itinerary as being one single product and therefore prices the
entire itinerary as opposed to adding up the fares for each segment involved.
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Connecting passengers are not only complex from an operational point of
view, they are also less favorable from an economic point of view. The customer
values connecting itineraries less than non-stop itineraries, so (all else being equal)
he is willing to pay a premium for not having to go through the hassle of connecting
between two flights. So are non-stop flights higher priced than connecting itineraries?
In general, there does not seem to be enough evidence to support such a hypothesis.
One reason for this is the fact that there are usually more connecting options than
non-stop options between any two cities. A passenger might value the time of
departure more than the total trip time and therefore choose a connecting itinerary at
his preferred time over a non-stop itinerary at a less desired time. However, for
markets that are served by at least one low-cost airline, this is less true. These
markets tend to have short stage-lengths, so the disutility of having to connect is very
high. Furthermore, LCAs tend to offer multiple non-stop services each day.
Consequently, the share of connecting passengers in these OD markets is typically
below the industry average.
2.4.3 Fleet
2.4.3.1 Industry Standards
The standard for low-cost airlines seems to be the Boeing 737 series.
Depending on the derivative, this type of aircraft can seat up to 189 passengers in an
all-economy-class configuration. It can fly between any two airports within continental
USA and could be certified for longer distances over water, such as the Atlantic.
What makes the 737 such a popular choice is that it is widely available. This doesn't
just apply for the aircraft itself, but also for pilots, engineers, maintenance
contractors, spare parts etc.
More recently, the Airbus 320 family is being used by low-cost airlines.
According to EasyJet (a recent Airbus customer), passengers clearly prefer the A320
family over the B737 series. JetBlue mentions better cabin technology, higher fuel
efficiency and a wider cabin as reasons for its decision to buy/lease A320s. A more
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realistic explanation might be Airbus' desire to be present in the low-cost airline
market and the resulting discounts that were given to the first few customers. The list
price would put the value of EasyJet's firm order of 120 A319s to roughly US$6
billion. According to the company's CEO Ray Webster, the purchase price will be "a
lot less than that".22 Sources rumor that the discounts could have been as high as
50% from the list price. According to EasyJet, the A319-1 00 will be more cost-
efficient to operate than the B737-700. Furthermore, part of the EasyJet-Airbus deal
is an extensive support and transition-cost sharing agreement.
Also the B757 is started to be used by low-cost airlines. Delta's Song is
currently using a B757-200 fleet. Also Orient Thai has plans to start its low-cost
subsidiary with B757-200 aircraft. According to Boeing, the aircraft "has the lowest
seat-mile operating cost in its market segment". It can seat up to 228 passengers.
Start-up low cost airlines such as AirAsia operate used aircraft unless they are
as comfortably financed as JetBlue, which operates a fleet of brand new aircraft.
Currently, used B737-200 aircraft are available from under US$3 million.2 The list
price of a new B737-700 is US$ 55 million.24 New aircraft are either purchased or
leased whereas used aircraft are generally bought. JetBlue CEO Neeleman has sat
on the board of a leasing company. In an interview he said: "Leasing companies
make a ton (of money). I decided we are going to buy our airplanes."25
Leasing tends to be the more costly option but offers some interesting
advantages. Most importantly, it makes the operation of an airline less capital
intensive because leasing doesn't tie down large amounts of capital. It also has some
tax advantages and offers more flexibility in terms of changing the size of the fleet to
adjust to the varying market demand.
2.4.3.2 Fleet Commonality
To achieve low costs, more important than the actual aircraft type is fleet
commonality. Reduced fleet complexity generates substantial savings in the form of
2 According to Boeing's 737 product information (ETOPS certification)
2 EasyJet CEO Ray Webster on CNN Money, October 14, 2002
24 www.aerobuy.com
2 The Business Times, September 19, 2003
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less ground support equipment, fewer training, lower spare parts inventories,
standardized handling and maintenance processes, flexible crew scheduling etc. A
1997 study of 40 of the world's largest airlines suggests that airlines with the most
uniform fleet (Southwest, Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific) also among the most
profitable.26 The study shows that the higher the number of aircraft per aircraft type,
the smaller the number of flight crew an airline needs to employ per aircraft. Most of
the existing low-cost airlines therefore operate one family of aircraft only.27
Fleet commonality reduces complexity but also flexibility. The airline cannot
change aircraft size to respond to changes in market demand. Changing capacity is
therefore only achievable by adding/dropping flights, which doesn't allow for minor
adjustments. Fleet commonality also makes an airline dependent on one supplier.
This increases the power of the supplier. However, with switching from Boeing to
Airbus, EasyJet has shown that it is possible to change supplier, although the
transitions costs in terms of training, maintenance equipment etc. will be substantial.
2.4.4 Marketing
2.4.4.1 Fare Products
Like all other airlines, low-cost airlines routinely use price discrimination as a
means to maximize revenue. As the willingness to pay differs across market
segments, airlines try to charge different fares to different passengers. But unlike
many established airline, most low-cost airlines do not offer business/first class
products. Differential pricing of connecting versus non-stop itineraries would not have
a big impact since connecting traffic is very limited. So as all passengers receive the
same service, the underlying product differentiation has to be based on different fare
products.
The various fare products differ in flexibility of purchase and flexibility of use.
The diverse fare restrictions are a way to segment the market and serve as fences to
25 JetBlue Airways: Starting from Scratch, HBS Case Study
26 Journal of Air Transport Management, Volume 3,1997
27 See Appendix 1 for details
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prevent diversion from one fare product to another. These restrictions include
minimum/maximum stay, advanced purchase requirements and fees for cancellations
and changes. The more flexible a ticket is, the higher its fare usually.
Comparing the practices of low-cost airlines with traditional airlines, the
restrictions applied to lower fares tend to be less stringent at low-cost airlines.
Furthermore, the difference between the lowest and highest fare is generally smaller
at LCAs. At Southwest the ratio is about 1:4. During the nineties, traditional carriers
were charging up to 12 times the lowest fare for an unrestricted Y-class fare. These
ratios have come down significantly since then but are still significantly higher at
established airlines than at LCAs.
2.4.4.2 Yield vs. Load Factor
Typically, established airlines tend to have a yield-focused sales strategy.
They try to maximize total revenues by maximizing the revenue of each passenger.
This means that passengers whose willingness to pay is too low will not be accepted.
This strategy leads to a high average yield, but to relatively low load factors.
The strategy of LCAs is generally different. They try to maximize revenues by
filling capacity. As long as the additional revenue is higher than marginal costs, an
LCA usually accepts bookings. This strategy leads to lower average yields, but higher
load factors.
Both strategies are potentially revenue maximizing. It all depends on the price
elasticity of demand. LCAs tend to operate in markets where price elasticity of
demand is high whereas traditional airlines generally cater to markets that have a
lower price elasticity. This explains why LCAs and traditional airline choose different
revenue maximizing strategies.
More recently, particularly in the US, evidence of these two distinct strategies
is disappearing. Southwest has been reporting load factors that are lower than the
load factors of most major US airlines. One reason might be Southwest's current
growth strategy, which is no longer based on adding new cities to the network but to
increase frequencies in existing markets. This might be the reason why demand has
increased lower than the increase in capacity. On the other hand, traditional airlines
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increasingly shift their objective to filling their capacity by offering lower fares due to
increased competition as well as the ongoing economic slowdown. This results in an
increase in load factor for traditional airlines and a decrease in the load factor of
LCAs as people switch back to traditional airlines.
2.4.4.3 Revenue Management
All low-cost airlines have revenue management systems in place, which come
in various degrees of sophistication. The main objective of these systems is to protect
seats for later-booking, high-fare passengers. Business travelers are willing to pay a
premium for making late or walk-up reservations. An airline has an interest to get this
premium but on the other hand needs to make sure that these seats are not sold at
lower fares earlier in the booking history of a flight. Hence, there is the risk that a
protected seat departs unoccupied although it could have been sold at lower fare
earlier. Protecting the right number of seats for later-booking business travelers is
therefore a key to maximizing the revenue of each flight.
Tight revenue control is important for low-cost airlines and they practice price
discrimination very extensively. At Southwest, 32% of passengers pay the highest
published fare. 28 According to Joyce Rogge, the company's Senior VP Marketing,
this is a far higher percentage than at any other established airline.
Some LCAs also use overbooking as part of their revenue maximization
strategy. Ryanair, which is actually more known for its low fares rather than its
service commitment, never overbooks any of its flights.29 Also JetBlue rarely reports
involuntary denied boardings and only few voluntary denied boardings.3
2.4.4.2 Distribution
Distribution costs are a major cost item for established airline. British Airways'
distribution costs were 9.5% of operating costs in 2002. At Ryanair, distribution costs
were 2.5% in the same period. This shows that distribution is an area where LCA can
2 Air Transport World, September 2002
29 According to Ryanair's Passenger Fares, Punctuality and Service Commitment (on
www.ryanair.com)
3 US DOT data (Q3 2002)
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generate significant cost savings compared to established airlines. Internet sales
plays a major role I this. According to the company's homepage, Southwest's cost
per booking via the Internet is less than $1 whereas the cost per booking via a travel
agent is in the $6 range. The cost per booking to Southwest via the airline's
reservations agents lies somewhere in between.
In Europe, internet bookings are by far the most common way in which low
cost airlines sell their tickets. EasyJet sells 91% of its tickets through its own website
and the rest through its call centers.31 The airline can therefore avoid the CRSs and
the involved costs. In addition to that, the airline has never paid a cent of commission
to travel agencies. Check Appendix 1 for an overview of different LCAs and their
share of online sales.
Air travel is not a physical product so the airline does not have to ship anything
to its customers after a reservation is made. This makes air travel perfect for online
distribution. Many traditional airlines still send paper tickets but virtually none of the
low-cost airlines do. When booked over the internet, the airline sends out an
electronic confirmation. This helps to reduce distribution costs and facilitates
reservation and check-in processes.
However, not everywhere is internet and credit card usage as high as in North
America and Europe. AirAsia was the first airline worldwide to accept reservation via
SMS sent from mobile phones. And Thai Airways is currently evaluating the
possibility of prepaid cards for its future low-cost subsidiary.
2.4.5 Finances
2.4.5.1 Revenues
Ticket sales are the most important source of revenue for an LCA. At EasyJet
it is 96% of total revenue. The rest comes from excess baggage charges, in-flight
sales, ticket change fees as well as commissions on travel insurance, hotel bookings
and car rentals. At other low-cost airlines, the picture looks similar as LCAs don't
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31 No Frills, Simon Calder, 2002
provide additional services such as cargo, handling or crew training. The percentage
of ticket revenues is significantly lower for most established airlines. Korean Air
makes only 58% of its revenue through ticket sales, the rest comes mainly from the
company's huge air cargo division.3 Such diversification has not been seen among
low-cost airlines, although partnerships to provide peripheral services (e.g. car rental
and travel insurance) are on the increase.
2.4.5.2 Expenditures
The three biggest operating cost items for almost any airline are staff, fuel and
depreciation/leasing costs, although not necessarily in this order. This is true for
LCAs and traditional airlines alike. Apart from that, traditional airlines have higher
sales costs reflecting the commissions and fees paid to travel agents and reservation
systems. Also handling and passenger service costs are generally higher among
traditional airlines, which is a result of the higher service standards and the use of
primary airports. All of these cost savings have been discussed in previous sections.
Also in non-operating costs, LCAs have a cost advantage over traditional
airlines. Southwest's cost of debt is 4.8% annually; Easyjet's is 5.3%.3 On the other
hand, Continental pays 12.5% for its debt and American Airlines 16.5%. This reflects
that the capital market evaluates investments into traditional airlines as fairly risky
compared to investments into LCAs. Also, most low-cost airlines tend to be more
equity financed than traditional airlines.35 Finally, there are also differences among
airlines with regard to the debt period, which also impacts the annual cost of debt.
2.4.5.3 Profitability
The traditional airline industry is a cyclical industry. This means that the
financial performance of traditional airlines follows the cycles of the world economy.
In 2002, none of the major US airlines posted a profit. In Europe and Asia, the results
32 Korean Air Annual Report 2002
3 AAPA Statistics, CAA Statistics, airline annual reports
3 Citigroup Study (2003)
3 Hoover's Online Financial Statistics (hoovers.com)
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were more mixed. There is little hope for established airlines that this will change
anytime soon. For 2003, IATA forecasts that its members will lose US$ 6.5 billion.36
Both in North America and Europe, all major low-cost airlines posted a profit in
2002. For Southwest, it was the 3 1st profitable year in a row. JetBlue reported an
operating profit margin of 16.5%, EasyJet reported 12.4% and Ryanair a whopping
31.3%.37 As of today, none of the major LCAs has ever posted an annual loss,
except during start-up years.38
2.4.5.4 Ownership
JetBlue, with US$130 million, was the best-funded start-up airline in the history
of commercial aviation.39 Southwest currently boasts a debt-to-equity ratio of 34%
while the industry stands at 71 %.40 And despite the uncertainty in the global stock
markets, EasyJet was able to finance 73% of the $600 million take-over of GO with
new equity.41 Many of today's low-cost airlines seem to be financed very well. As this
thesis will discuss later, solid financing is a key to success for any start-up airline.
The ones that survive the first few years in business are most likely the ones that
have very sound finances.
Traditional carriers are either publicly listed companies, government owned, or
a combination of the two. Besides governments, investors tend to be institutional
investors rather than private ones. In some cases, employees hold a substantial part
of an airline's shares. United Airlines employees held 55% of the company's shares
in 2002. None of the low-cost airlines is government owned. Although Thai Airways is
a state-enterprise, its planned low-cost subsidiary will be a private company.
Because of the high risks involved, start-ups tend to be privately funded with the
management being among the investors. An IPO usually follows a few years after the
start-up.
36 IATA press release (September 8, 2003)
37 Hoover's Online Business Database (www.hoovers.com)
38 annual reports
39 Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Press Release (February 10, 2000)
4 www.airlines.org
41 Scotsman Evening News, May 16, 2002
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Employee ownership plans are also found among low-cost airlines. Southwest
employees held 12% of the company in 2002 as part of an employee profit-sharing
plan.
2.4.6 Labor
2.4.6.1 Labor Productivity
Efficient use of assets is one of the key principles of the LCA business model.
And one of the most important and most valuable assets of an airline is labor. Most
industry analysts recognize that a major cost difference between established airlines
and LCAs is found in the labor bill, both in terms of wages and work rules.
A recent study done by The Boston Consulting Group suggests that more than
half of an LCA's labor cost advantage stems from higher productivity. According to
the study, 60% of the costs saving are due to the higher productivity and only 40%
due to lower costs per full time employee. Appendix 1 shows that employees at both
Southwest and JetBlue produce more ASKs than their colleagues at Continental and
Southwest. And this despite shorter stage lengths and smaller average aircraft size of
the two LCAs.
2.4.6.2 Cost of Labor
Salaries at low-cost airlines tend to be below the industry average. According
to a Unisys study, the average total cost for a pilot at Southwest is US$139,000 per
year. At American Airlines, pilots cost US$208,000 annually. However, if
productivity is taken into account, this is even more compelling. The annual block
hours per pilot are 790 for Southwest and 537 for American. Hence, per block hour, a
Southwest pilot costs US$176, whereas an American Airlines pilot costs US$387,
20% more. After adjusting for the structural differences between the two airlines (e.g.
average aircraft size, average stage length), the same study estimates that the pilot
at AA produces 32% fewer ASKs than the pilot at Southwest.
42 Los Angeles Times, December 4, 2002
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2.4.6.3 Corporate Culture
Southwest was included in Fortune magazine's list "100 Best Companies to
Work for in America" and the company has consistently enjoyed a employee turnover
rate lower than any other US airline.44 It is Southwest's policy that employees are the
airline's number one customers. Why this strong focus on corporate culture?
Many processes in an airline's operations need a high degree of coordination.
In a low cost airline, this is even more the case since efficiency is closely correlated
with coordination. Hence, good labor relations and a corporate culture that supports
the processes are crucial to the success of a low-cost airline. For airlines like
Ryanair, this is more difficult as the company has staff in many different countries
with different languages and different work cultures. That's why Ryanair outsources
most of the operation abroad and put less effort on building a strong corporate
culture.
2.5 Service
All airlines are service providers. It is therefore important to examine the link
between service and the LCA business model. The service of LCAs is different from
the services that established airline produce. However, service is a broad term and
not easy to define. This thesis will therefore make a distinction between level of
service, service performance and customer satisfaction and discuss them separately.
Level of service says something about what services are provided. For
instance, many low-cost airlines do not offer internet check-in, airports lounges, seat
assignments etc. whereas many established airlines do. So with regard to pre-flight
services, LCAs tend to offer a lower level of service, or in other words, they don't
provide all the services that many established airlines do.
Service Performance says something about the degree of excellence with
which the level of service is provided. An airline can offer a very low level of service
but still offer a high service performance. For instance, Southwest's level of service in
43 Unisys Management Consulting (www.unisys.com/transportation)
The Southwest Airlines Way, Jody Hoffer Gittell, 2002
37
terms of baggage handling is about as high as any other US airline because the
airline provides roughly the same baggage handling services to its customers than
any other airline in the US. However, the service performance of this service is higher
since Southwest mishandles a fewer number of suitcases per 1,000 passengers than
most other US carriers.45
Customer Satisfaction measures perceived service quality against service
expectations. Neither the level of service nor the service quality say something about
the success the service offering has in the marketplace. Singapore Airlines' level of
service is very high and the airline is very profitable. Ryanair's level of service is very
low and the airline is also very profitable. However, there is strong evidence that
suggests a positive correlation between customer satisfaction and the company's
profitability.46
2.5.1 Level of Service
All airlines provide the same core service: air transportation for passengers
with their baggage from point A to point B. LCAs and traditional airlines do not differ
greatly in this respect. It is what defines a passenger airline. The level of core
services is therefore about the same across airlines.
However, established airlines usually provide more add-on services such as
free meals and access to airport lounges, which have little to do with air
transportation itself. These additional services are provided in order to earn additional
money from the customer. Most LCAs refrain from offering such additional services
for the reasons discussed earlier in this chapter.
In some aspects, the level of service of some US airlines has been decreasing
lately. American Airlines no longer serves free food in economy class on flights up to
4 hours.47 Customers can no longer receive free paper tickets for most of their
American Airlines flights. As the range of add-on services shirks, the level of service
of established airlines gets more similar to the level of service that is offered by
4s US DOT's Air Consumer Report (October 2003)
46 Built for Use: Driving Profitability through the User Experience, Karen Donoghue, 2002
47 USA Today, August 22, 2002
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LCAs. Whether this is a viable strategy for AA or whether the two business models
are on a collision course will be discussed later in Chapter 5.
2.5.3 Service Performance
As LCAs provide only limited add-on services, comparing the service quality of
LCAs and established airlines makes sense only if core services are measured up
against eachother.
Service is difficult to measure as the perception and importance of a service
element differs from one customer to another. This thesis will therefore focus on the
service performance measures used by the US Department of Transportation. It uses
three main measurements to evaluate the service performance of major US airlines,
all of which measure the quality of a core service directly related to air transportation:
* On Time Performance (OTP):
" Involuntary Denied Boardings (IDB):
" Mishandled Baggage (MHB):
percentage of flights that arrived
on-time48
involuntary denied boardings per
10,000 enplanements
reports per 1,000 enplanements
The following table is an attempt to compare the core services of two
American LCAs and two established American airlines. It uses 2003 Q2 data (April-
June) from the US DOT's Air Travel Consumer Report.
48 on-time: arrival within 15 minutes of scheduled arrival time (US DOT definition)
39
OTP IDB MHB
Jet Blue 87.5% 0.00 3.56
Southwest 88.8% 1.25 3.52
American 83.8% 0.71 4.41
Continental 85.4% 1.35 3.01
Delta 85.1% 1.68 3.79
Northwest 85.2% 0.86 3.50
United 85.9% 0.79 4.02
US Industry Average 84.7% 1.08 4.28
Table 2.1: Service performance of selected US carriers
Not surprisingly, the on-time performance of the two LCAs seems to be higher.
The reasons for this are the key elements of the LCA business model described
earlier. Particularly the use of secondary airports and the disregard of connecting
passengers are responsible for these good results.
The results for involuntary denied boardings are less clear. There seems to be
no difference between LCAs and established carriers. The LCA business model does
not advocate a specific strategy regarding overbooking. It is more part of an airline's
service strategy how aggressively it wants to overbook its flights. Ryanair never
overbooks its flights whereas Southwest does. JetBlue does it cautiously with no IDB
during the period and only 6 voluntary denied boardings.
For mishandled baggage, the two LCAs report similar numbers (below the
industry average) whereas the established airlines differ significantly. LCAs carry
fewer connecting passengers, hence the possibility of mishandling a piece of luggage
is a lot lower than at network carriers. And LCAs also have to handle fewer checked
bags, as people carry less baggage on their relatively short flights. However,
Continental reports the lowest number in this sample, although a substantial number
of passengers connect from one flight to another.
US DOT survey only covers two LCAs so this survey is statistically not
significant. However, all of JetBlue's figures are above the industry average whereas
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all of American Airlines' figures are below the industry average. This might suggest
that the quality of core services tends to be better at LCAs than at established
airlines.
2.5.3 Customer Satisfaction
Whether a service offering is successful or not has something to do with
customer satisfaction. A customer is satisfied if his perceptions of the delivered
service level and quality exceeds his expectations.
The following table compares the satisfaction of customers of two US LCAs
and five US established airlines. Consumer Complaints (CC) is a US DOT measure
that is defined as the number of consumer complaints per 100,000 enplanements.
2003 April to June data is used. ACSI is the American Customer Satisfaction Index
and measures consumer satisfaction on a scale from 1 to 100. 49First quarter 2003
data is used.
CC ACSI
JetBlue 0.43 n/a
Southwest 0.15 75
American 0.94 67
Continental 1.03 68
Delta 0.88 67
Northwest 1.11 64
United 0.86 63
US Industry Average 0.77 67
Table 2.2: Customer satisfaction index of selected US carriers
49Administrated by the University of Michigan Business School
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These numbers suggest that LCAs enjoy fewer complaints and higher
customer satisfaction. Of course one has to take into account that network airlines
have by definition of their operation a disadvantage over LCAs. The operation of an
international network carrier is far more complex than a domestic point-to-point
airline. So more things can potentially go wrong on a Boston-Newark-Tokyo-Bangkok
itinerary than on a Providence-Baltimore flight.
2.6 Development Cycle 50
2.6.1 Set-Up
These are approximately the first two years of the life of an airline. It is
arguably the most critical phase of the airline since most start-ups do not survive the
first two years. Competitive responses from other airlines are most aggressive.
Expensive lawsuits, price wars with other airlines and initial advertising campaigns
will likely narrow the financial resources of the young company. That doesn't mean
that LCAs can't be profitable during this time. JetBlue was profitable within its first
year of operation.51 Successful operations are crucial since it is the time when the
company builds its values and brand. Also, media attention tends to be highest.
Singapore's ValueAir is currently in the set-up phase.
2.6.2 Penetration
After the initial phase, the airline will capitalize on backbone markets. It will
develop high-density trunk routes as frequencies to existing markets requires less
capital than developing new markets. AirAsia is currently is the penetration phase.
50 Following the development cycle classification of Roland Berger Strategy Consultants
51 JetBlue 101 on www.jetblue.com
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2.6.3 Entrenchment
The next big step is an initial public offering. An IPO provides fresh capital for
developing the network and expanding the fleet. The company's investors have
incentives to go public as investments into start-up airlines are extremely risky. An
IPO allows the original investors to realize an appropriate return on their risky
investment.
With the additional funds, the airline can develop new destinations. Later, the
LCA might develop a multi-base network. JetBlue is currently developing Long Beach
(California) to its second domestic base.
2.6.4 Internationalization
After having penetrated the home market, an LCA might look for destination
abroad. Virgin Blue recently applied for traffic fights to fly from Australia to New
Zealand. Later, the airline might even develop a base in a foreign country. Ryanair
has created a base in Hahn near Frankfurt (Germany).
Southwest has never showed intentions to enter international markets. This
however might be a special case, as the USA is such a large market for air
transportation. So although Southwest is in business for a long time and has gotten
quite big, there are still markets to be penetrated domestically.
2.6.5 Adaptation
As low-cost airlines grow older, they will acquire some of the attributes of
traditional carriers. Southwest, in business for 32 years now, has a highly unionized
workforce, carries a substantial amount of connecting passengers and its operating
margin is down to a one-digit figure. However, the company's business philosophy,
corporate culture and operating strategy have changed little despite it now being one
of the majors in the US.
This is also the period when the LCA model reaches its limits. Not all OD
markets support low-cost airlines, hence, at some point the market reaches
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saturation and growth will be very limited. Some analysts suggest that 100 PDEW
(passengers per day each way) is the threshold for a LCA to successfully enter a OD
market. If this is correct, the growth of American LCAs is severely limited by the fact
that they already serve 82% of all these markets. Furthermore, out of the 213 OD
markets that are left, 45% are slot controlled or over 2'000 miles in length. So only
118 OD markets are immediate candidates for LCAs. And these markets would only
produce an additional 1.6% new market share for LCAs. Under this scenario,
Southwest's growth would be limited to 0.2%. 3
2.7 Form
Low-cost airlines do not come in a definitive form. It can vary in structure and
purpose depending on market context, ownership arrangements, competition and
geography. There are at least three broad forms that can be identified.
2.7.1 Independent Low-Cost Airlines
These are carriers that are founded by a group of private investors or are
existing carriers that have been turned into low-cost airlines. They adhere to the
principles of the LCA model and show most of the features described in this chapter.
Transporting passengers is usually their only business, diversification is rare. The
vast majority of these airlines either operate in North America or Europe. Examples
include Southwest, EasyJet, and Ryanair.
2.7.2 Low-Cost Subsidiaries of Established Airlines
These are low-cost airlines that are owned (and usually managed) by a
traditional airline. They are introduced as a competitive response to the start-up of
independent low-cost airlines. These companies are often difficult to sustain since
52 Growth of Low-fare Carriers, Bill Swelbar of ECLAT Consulting, at MIT's 2 nd Annual Airline Industry
Conference (April 2003)
53 In terms of ASKs
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they compete directly with the parent company. Many of them disappear or are sold
within few years of their start-up.
Current examples of wholly-owned LCA subsidiaries of traditional airlines
include Air Canada's ZIP, BMI's bmibaby and SAS's Snowflake.5 4 British Airways'
GO was sold. So was KLM's buzz. Swiss aborted plans for its proposed low-cost
subsidiary in 2003 as the company's pilot union didn't accept the plan.
An important reason for having a separate entity is the contracts with the
different stakeholders, employees in particular. One of the main cost drivers of an
airline is labor. Traditional airlines have been in business for several decades and
seniority is therefore a big issue. Also, these labor agreements tend to have some
form of scope clause. The only way an airline can operate its low-cost services under
a different labor agreement is to set up a separate legal entity.
Although a separate company, there are usually strong ties to the parent
company. United Airlines recently announced plans to set up a low-cost subsidiary.
According to UAL, the new subsidiary will have a distinct management team, but the
parent company will hold on to pricing, scheduling and marketing.55 This seems to be
the most common setup for such entities.
Cannibalization is always a major issue in such arrangements. But airlines are
realizing that cannibalizing their own business hurts less than losing business to
other airlines completely.
2.7.3 "No Frills" Services of Traditional Airlines
These services are also operated by traditional carriers but lack the
independence of being real subsidiaries. Some airlines use the assets of the parent
company. At Delta Express, the staff, aircraft, distribution channels etc. were taken
over from Delta's mainline operation. Other airlines decide not to operate the services
themselves. Swissair Express flights, for instance, were operated by aircraft and crew
of Flightline.
54 Reed's Air Transport Intelligence (www.rati.com)
55 Aviation Daily, February 25, 2003
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As these services replace existing mainline services, they tend to be offered
out of the (usually congested) hub of the airline. This is to ensure that these flights
remain part of the airline's overall network. Such operations therefore experience
difficulties in achieving the cost structures of an independent LCA. Such services can
achieve higher aircraft utilization and higher load factors but the unit costs may not
differ greatly from the airline's mainline operation because they use the same assets,
same contracts and fly the same routes.
As discussed, "no frills" services of traditional airlines profit from the brand and
infrastructure of the parent company. Hence, brand dilution is a severe problem and
many of these services no longer exist. Delta continues to be convinced of the
viability of this model but changes the Delta Express business plan by starting to
operate "Song".
2.7.4 "No Frills" Services of Charter Airlines
Charter airlines play a major role in Europe's leisure markets. And as
European LCAs such as Ryanair and EasyJet service many of these markets, some
European charter airlines now have their own LCA services. They are usually not
independent subsidiaries but are part of the normal operations of the airline.
"No frills" services of traditional airlines didn't seem to be sustainable. But
since charter airline operate at much lower unit costs and have a different corporate
culture, this might prove to be an successful business model. Examples include
Volare's Volareweb in Italy and Happag-Lloyd's Happag-Lloyd Express in Germany.
2.8 Failures
According to the Aviation Institute of the George Washington University, 80-
85% of the mostly low-cost start-ups in the US since deregulation have failed. In
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Europe, 60% have ended up bankrupt. A 1998 study by the institute rated the causes
of failures in the following order.56
" Inadequate or inappropriate operational plans
" Excessive debt
" Escalating costs
* Inadequate traffic
" Economic downturns
" Inability to obtain financing
" Lack of management expertise
The list makes clear that the failures have more to do with poor business
planning, over-ambition and management shortcomings rather than with inherent
problems in the LCA model. The model has proven to be working in various market
environments and leaves room for various adaptations.
Most low -cost subsidiaries of existing airlines also no longer exist. Some
people argue that low-cost subsidiaries are doomed to fail. If they do not make
money, the parent company declares it a failure and terminates operations (e.g.
Continental Lite). If the subsidiary does make money, it starts to compete with the
parent company and is terminated too (e.g. British Airways' GO).
2.9 Summary
The LCA business model does not re-invent the business of flying. Most of the
processes found in a traditional airline are also found in an LCA. There is no
fundamental difference in what low-cost airlines do. However, there is a lot of
difference in how they do these things.
The LCA business model's main theme is high utilization of assets. All key
elements described in this chapter eventually target effective use of the airline's
56 An Examination Why New Entrant Airlines Fail by Daryl Jenkins, Director, The Aviation Institute, The
George Washington Institute, June 1998
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assets. That is why all LCAs have aircraft utilization figures and labor productivity
numbers that are significantly above the industry average.
Despite this common theme, today's low-cost airlines look very different from
each other. Southwest, Ryanair and AirAsia are among the airlines that use the LCA
business model in its purest form. Virgin Blue on the other hand could almost be
classified as an established airline. A distinction between LCA and non-LCA is not
sufficient. One needs to look at each specific airline in order to understand how it
uses the LCA business model.
Low-cost airlines have been very successful in North America, Europe and
Australia. First steps have been taken in South America, South Africa and Asia. After
looking at the Asian airline industry in Chapter 3, the key elements that have been
discussed here will be taken up again in Chapter 4 in order to evaluate the viability of
the LCA business model in Asia.
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3. The Asian Airline Industry
3.1 Introduction
Since Southwest Airlines started in 1971, low-cost airlines have been
increasingly affecting the airline industry in North America. Competition has
increased, yields have fallen and several traditional airlines no longer exist. Europe is
about to experience the same phenomenon. The question therefore is, whether Asia
is going to be next. This chapter will examine the Asian airline industry and point out
the differences that exist between Asia and other parts of the world. Chapter 4 will
then go on and analyze in what ways the low-cost airline business model that was
described in Chapter 2 might be applicable to Asia.
Asia is a vast and extreme continent, home to more than half of the world's
population. It is one of the most diverse continents in terms of culture, economic
progress and geography. The same is true for the region's airline industry, which is
also one the most diverse in the world. Some of the Asian carriers are among the
most competitive and most profitable airlines in the world. Others could not survive
without the backing of their respective governments.
Due to the rapid economic growth in the region, the demand for air transport
within the region picked-up substantially over the last two decades. As this economic
growth is likely to continue into the foreseeable future, also air traffic is expected to
growth. In 1997, IATA forecasted Asia-Pacific passenger traffic would grow 7.4% per
year until 2010, more than twice the rate in the rest of the world.57 However, Asia's
airline industry has had to face many disruptive years recently. In 1997 the Asian
Economic Crisis, in 2001 the terrorist attacks in the US, in 2002 the Bali bombings
and in 2003 the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). All
these events had severe impacts on the region's airlines. Today, the Asian airline
industry is still somewhat tattered from these events. And despite significant
forecasted growth and new opportunities that open up (e.g. in China), the Asian
airline industry needs to address some fundamental challenges in the coming years.
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Asia as defined in this thesis includes all countries and territories in the time
zones UTC+5 to UTC+9, with the exceptions of the Russian Far East and Australia.
Asia-Pacific will include Australia and New Zealand.
Throughout this chapter, frequent reference will be made to AAPA
(Association of Asia-Pacific Airlines), AEA (Association of European Airlines) and
ATA (Air Transport Association of America). A directory of member airlines of these
associations can be found in Appendix 2.1.
3.2 The Airlines
3.2.1 State-Owned Airlines
Most countries in Asia used to own their flag carrier. Some of these airlines are
still state enterprises, few of them have been partly or fully privatized, others no
longer exist. Appendix 2.2 gives an overview of the ownership of all AAPA member
airlines in Asia. It is worth noting that most private airlines have been private from the
start. Only Korean Air was the outcome of a privatization effort. It seems that many
Asian countries do not want to give up control over their national carriers.
One of the main reasons given by these countries is that a national airline is
needed to support the national economy.58 While it is easy for a market economist to
dismiss this argument, objectives such as promotion of tourism may be legitimate
goals. Many remote tourist destinations in other parts of the world such as Tahiti,
Papua New Guinea or Malta have their own state-run airlines. Neither of the flag
carriers of these three nations posted a profit in 2002.59 Their main objective is to
support the country's economy by promoting incoming tourism.
Other nations say that they need the national airline to reduce the balance of
payments deficit. However, purchasing/leasing of aircraft, fuel and other services
usually involve substantial foreign cash outflows so that this argument may not be
57 Shaping Air Transport in Asia Pacific, Tae Hoon Oum and Chunyan Yu, 2000
58 Impediments to Liberalization in Asia Pacific International Aviation, Michael Tretheway, 1996
59 Reed Business Information (www.rati.com)
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very convincing. Another important argument may be the wish of countries to have
access to aircraft in times of national emergencies. While this argument seems to be
theoretically sound, the US government is regularly seizing aircraft from US airlines.60
Airlines do not need to be state enterprises, also commercial airlines can be forced to
fulfill certain duties in times of a national emergency.
Many of these arguments seem to lose relevance as the world economic and
geopolitical landscape has changed. Many governments realized that it is in their
nation's interests to privatize their flag carrier. That's why many European airlines
have been privatized over the last two decades and analysts expect to see more
privatizations of airlines (e.g. in Asia) in the near future.61 However, although several
nations around the world have privatized their national airline, they usually do not
allow airlines to be owned by foreign investors. Therefore, some Asian countries may
find it difficult to privatize their state-owned carrier simply because of a lack of viable
domestic investors. Then again, the example of state-owned Singapore Airlines
shows that national carriers can be run like private enterprises and be highly
profitable, while still be under the de-facto control of a national government.
3.2.2 Private Airlines
Unlike in Europe, most large airlines in Asia that are private enterprises today,
started off as private airlines. Most Asian AAPA member airlines that are private
today were privately run from the beginning (see Appendix 2.2). This includes
carriers such as Japan Airlines or Cathay Pacific.6 2 Part and full privatizations have
been rare in Asia.
There have been many private start-ups in Asia in recent years, particularly
regional/domestic airlines. In large island nations such as the Philippines and
Indonesia, air transportation is a vital form of transportation. Hence, governments
have liberalized their domestic airline industry early, which opened the skies for new
60 The US Defense Production Act of 1950 provides the legal basis for the President of the Unites
States to allocate industrial production and services to the Department of Defense during a national
emergency.
61 Privatization in Asia Pacific Aviation, Peter Forsyth,1996
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private entrants. Filipinos can fly domestically with 13 different private airlines today
and Indonesians can choose between 19 different private domestic airlines.
3.2.3 Regional and Domestic Airlines
The Asian airline industry is characterized by large airline companies whose
main business is operating intercontinental and transcontinental services. Because
Asia is such a vast continent, most intra-Asia flights are characterized by long stage
lengths. Singapore Airlines services some of its less dense regional routes through
its subsidiary Silk Air. Cathay Pacific works together with regional carrier Dragonair.
However, Silk Air and Dragonair have average passenger hauls of 1,468km and
1 ,260km respectively, and none of these airlines operate aircraft with less than 100
seats. So although they are generally referred to as regional airlines, they look very
different from regional airlines in Europe and North America.
In many countries, domestic travel is still dominated by surface transportation
as air transportation is not affordable to most lower income groups. But the fist step
towards liberalizing air transportation is usually liberalizing domestic air services.
Hence, several Asian nations have seen domestic start-up carriers. In China and
Indonesia, domestic airlines are a common sight as the vast geographical
dimensions of these countries make alternative modes of transport less competitive.
Thailand has a few regional/domestic airlines that mainly cater to the large tourist
markets. Also Japan has several domestic airlines, but traffic within the country
continues to be dominated by JAL and All Nippon Airways.
3.2.4 Fifth Freedom Airlines
The Fifth Freedom of the Air stands for the right of an air carrier to pick up
revenue passengers from a country other than its country of registry and deliver them
to a third country, also not its country of registry, on flights that connect to/from its
62 Reed Business Information (www.rati.com)
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country of registry. This arrangement requires the approval of all three governments
involved.
While there is virtually no fifth freedom traffic in North America and only little in
Europe, Asia sees many fifth freedom carriers operating in the region. Between
Bangkok and Singapore, in addition to Thai Airways and Singapore Airlines, there are
currently 8 fifth freedom carriers serving this market.63
Many Asian carriers enjoy fifth freedom rights within Asia. These traffic rights
are negotiated between the governments involved and are usually based on
reciprocity. For instance, Taiwan grants Thai Airways the right to offer services
between Hong Kong and Taipei. At the same time, Thailand grants Taiwanese
carriers the rights to fly from Bangkok to Amsterdam.
Also many European airlines enjoy fifth freedom rights in Asia. The flights of
European airlines arrive Asia in the early afternoon. These aircraft cannot fly back to
Europe until late at night, because they would arrive in Europe in late at night/early in
the morning. This is inconvenient for passengers (particularly the ones with onward
connections) and might even be prohibited by night curfews at many European
airports. Hence, aircraft of European airlines have to spend several hours in Asia
before returning back to Europe. Instead of not utilizing these aircraft during this time,
most European airlines decide to fly to secondary destinations beyond their primary
ones. Swiss flights to Bangkok continue to Singapore, and Manila is served as an
extension of the Zurich - Hong Kong flight.
For US carriers, the main gateway cities in Asia are Tokyo and Hong Kong.
Both United and Northwest enjoy fifth freedom rights beyond these two cities. Also
several African and Middle Eastern airlines were granted fifth freedom rights in Asia.
Both Ethiopian Airlines and Emirates currently offer services between Bangkok and
Hong Kong.
Many of these flights are flown as extensions of intercontinental flights. Due to
scheduling constraints and flights across different time-zones, aircraft can usually not
fly the return leg of the intercontinental flight immediately after having arrived in Asia.
Hence, the aircraft and crew would sit idle for several hours. However, the cost
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difference between having an aircraft parked on the tarmac versus having the aircraft
flying is relatively low. And as the latter option generates revenue, an airline might
decide to fly an extension during this period. As a consequence, might make sense
not to allocate the full amount of overhead costs to these flight segments. Hence,
markets with many fifth freedom carriers (e.g. Bangkok - Singapore, Bangkok -
Hong Kong) tend to have some of the lowest fares in Asia.
The rationale behind allowing fifth freedom carriers has usually nothing to do
with creating a liberal air service environment. Even the very liberal Canada - US
Open Skies Agreement of 1995 excludes fifth freedom rights.64 Nations tend to
reluctantly allow fifth freedom rights to foreign airlines. Japan was forced to give
unlimited fifth freedom rights beyond Japan to the United States after being defeated
in World War Two.65 Thailand allowed fifth freedom carriers on important routes such
as to Amsterdam, Sydney or Hong Kong mainly due to the fact that the government
wanted to stimulate tourism but the national carrier was not able to grow fast enough.
3.2.4 Charter Airlines
Despite having many leisure destinations in Asia, there are no major charter
airlines in Asia. Airline Business' listing of the world's top 50 charter airlines does not
include any airline from Asia.66 Most of the scheduled airlines in the region provide
non-scheduled services. However, from all AAPA member airlines, only Garuda
earns a substantial share (13%) of its operating revenue from non-scheduled
services.
3.3 Networks
Several major US airlines (e.g. American, Continental) serve more than 70
destinations in North America. And also in Europe, several major airlines together
with their regional subsidiaries (e.g. Air France, Lufthansa) serve well over 70
63 OAG October 2003 data
64 Canada-US Open Skies, Michael W. Thretheway, 1996
65 Air Transport Policy in Japan: Limited Competition under Regulation, Hirotaka Yamauchi, 1996
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European destinations. In Asia, networks tend to be less dense. Singapore Airlines
together with its regional subsidiary Silk Air currently serve 52 destinations in Asia.
Hong Kong's Cathay Pacific currently serves 44 Asian destinations, of which 22 are
served by its partner Dragonair. Thai Airways serves 38 international Asian
destination and an additional 12 domestically in Thailand. One of the reasons for this
is that economic activity is much more centered in Asia than in the rest of the world.
Most Asian nations have one or two economic centers, one of which usually is the
capital.
With 83%, most of the system-wide RPKs of AAPA airlines are generated on
international routes.67 Only All Nippon Airways and Qantas have domestic operations
with more than 5 million RPKs annually. In many other countries, domestic travel is
dominated by surface transportation, as air transportation is only affordable to a
relatively small percentage of the population.
Virtually all flights of major Asian airlines are flights to and from the airlines'
hubs. This is mainly due to the fact that most flights are international and therefore
subject to bilateral air service agreements. And as these agreements do not usually
allow for flights from a foreign state into another foreign state, virtually all flights are to
and from the hub in the airline's country of origin. This encourages/forces Asian
airlines to develop hub-and-spoke networks.
However, the vast dimensions of the Asian continent makes it difficult for a
single airline to set-up a hub-and-spoke network that efficiently covers the entire
region. Intra-continental networks of European and North American airlines are much
more efficient as both continents are significantly smaller. And North American
airlines have the additional benefit of being able to operate multiple-hub networks as
the entire region is under one jurisdiction.
Global airline alliances are a way to virtually extend the network coverage of
each individual member airline. All of these alliances currently have only one major
US member airline. This is enough as the network of one US airline covers the entire
region rather efficiently. In Europe, these alliances usually have one major airline
66 October 2003 issue
67 AAPA Statistical Report 2002
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together with several smaller airlines to cover the entire region. In Asia, airline
alliances need multiple major airlines to cover the continent effectively. When looking
at the global flow of traffic, it makes sense for Asian airlines to be part of a global
alliance. Hence, both Singapore Airlines and Thai Airways work together with various
Star Alliance carriers. However, this may bring difficulties locally. As the networks of
both airlines overlap to a large extent, they cooperate very little among themselves.
3.4 Fleet
65% of all aircraft in AAPA's fleet are wide-body aircraft. 8 This is substantially
more than in Europe or North America. AEA airlines have 20% wide-body aircraft in
their fleet and ATA members 19%.69 Also the fact that most A380 orders came from
Asian carriers is an indicator that flying in Asia is and will continue to be dominated
by wide-body aircraft. Some Asian airlines (e.g. Cathay Pacific, Singapore Airlines)
operate exclusively wide-body aircraft, while narrow-body aircraft are operated by
their regional subsidiaries. Regional jets and turboprop aircraft are far less common
in Asia than in North America or Europe. Most of them service domestic routes.
Of course, many Asian airlines fly long-haul routes to Europe, North America
and Australia/New Zealand that must be flown by wide-body aircraft due to the long
distances. But also most of the intra-Asia flying is done with wide-body aircraft. Only
2 out of the current 22 frequencies between Bangkok and Singapore are flown with
narrow-body aircraft, although the flight time is less then two hours.
Stage length is not what makes Asian carrier use wide-body aircraft on intra-
Asian routes. So is it traffic level? Generally, no. About the same number of
passengers travel between San Francisco (SFO) and Los Angeles (LAX) as do
between Bangkok (BKK) and Singapore (SIN) each day. While the 24 flights
between the two US cities are all operated by narrow-body aircraft, nearly all of the
22 flights between the two Asian cities are operated by wide-body aircraft. So Asian
68 AAPA Statistical Report 2002
69 AEA and ATA reports
7 OAG data (October 2003)
7 AAPA Statistical Report 2002
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carriers could easily accommodate the existing traffic with smaller aircraft. This would
suggest that Asian airlines have relatively low intra-Asian load-factors. Is that true?
There is indeed some evidence for that. Singapore Airlines' system-wide load factor
is 74.5%, but on Asian routes the factor is down to 67.5%. The same is true for
Malaysia Airlines (63.1%) and several other major Asian carriers. What seems to
be the reason for that?
As mentioned, Asian airlines must necessarily have wide-body aircraft as there
is no other way of servicing European and North American destinations. These
intercontinental flights generally arrive in Asia early morning and leave again around
midnight. An Asian airline will therefore have this capacity available during the day in
Asia. Hence, it will rather fly these existing aircraft at relatively low load-factors
across Asia as opposed to buy additional narrow-body aircraft.
This has important impacts on frequency. Singapore Airlines provides roughly
1'750 seats from Singapore to Bangkok each day.74 United Airlines provides about
the same number of seats between Boston and Chicago each day. However, while
Singapore Airlines offers 5 daily frequencies, United offers 13.75 Also Appendix 2.3
shows that 9 out of the top 10 AAPA city pairs have weekly frequencies of 84 or less.
This is significantly lower than any of the top 10 ATA city pairs.76
Another important reason for operating large aircraft in Asia is the fact that the
level of competition is usually quite low. In many domestic markets, US airlines
compete on frequency. Both American Airlines and United Airlines offer hourly flights
between Chicago (ORD) and New York (LGA) from 06:00 to 20:00. Due to limited
competition in many Asian markets, Asian airlines generally do not compete on
frequency. And since offering low frequencies with large aircraft is cheaper than high
frequencies with small planes, Asian airlines tend to choose the low frequency
approach.
72 DOT Form 41 data, AAPA 2002 Annual Report
7 2002 Annual Report (not including domestic operations)
74 OAG schedule and capacity data (October 2003)
75 OAG schedule and capacity data (October 2003)
76 ATA Annual Report 2002
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Also some bilateral agreements may limit the number of frequencies that an
airline can offer between two cities in Asia. This too, forces Asian airlines to operate
large aircraft.
3.5 Traffic Levels
In 2000, intra-Asia-Pacific RPK accounted for 14% of world RPK.77 Airbus
expects this figure to grow to 18.4% by 2020, suggesting that Asia-Pacific will have
displaced North America as the largest intra-regional market for air transportation by
that time.
OD traffic data for Asia-Pacific not readily available, unless bought from a CRS
provider. The following analysis of traffic level will therefore rely on traffic data as
reported by AAPA. City pair will be defined as two cities that are linked with at least
one direct flight by one or more AAPA member airlines.
In 2001, AAPA member airlines served 246 international city pairs in Asia, with
an average number of daily passengers of 314 (in each direction). 8 59% of these city
pairs had daily traffic of 100 passengers or more, which is a level that generally
justifies one daily return flight with widely-used narrow-body aircraft type such as the
B737 or A319/A320. It is also the threshold that analysts suggest is needed for low-
cost airlines to enter a market.79 Appendix 2.3 lists AAPA's top ten intra-Asia city
pairs by passenger numbers.
The city pairs that rank highest, usually include a hub of a major airline at one
end or the other. These hubs are where intercontinental traffic connects to/from intra-
Asia flights. Hence, a significant share of passengers between these city pairs does
not originate in Asia. Another substantial part does not terminate in Asia. Plus, also a
significant part of intra-Asia traffic is likely to be connecting at a hub.
The city pair with the highest number of daily passengers is Hong Kong -
Taipei. The reason for this it that Taiwan and Mainland China have very close social
7 Airbus Global Market Forecast (2002)
78 PDEW: passengers per day each way
79 Growth of Low-fare Carriers, Bill Swelbar of ECLAT Consulting, at MIT's 2 nd Annual Airline Industry
Conference (April 2003)
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and economic ties but direct flights are not allowed between the two countries.
Therefore all passengers wishing to travel between the two countries must fly via a
third state. Hong Kong SAR is geographically one of the most convenient. That's why
traffic numbers between Taipei and Hong Kong are artificially high. According to
analysts, this might change soon as the Chinese government is likely to grant
permission for direct flights between the two countries.
Intra-Asian traffic does experience some peaking, e.g. during the Chinese New
Year festivities. However, unlike traffic within North America or within Europe, Asian
airlines and airports do not experience a high degree of seasonal peaking. Summer
months tend to be the busiest months for airlines and airports in North America and
Europe, mainly due to increased leisure traffic. But due to cultural and climatic
reasons, this phenomenon is far less accentuated in many markets in Asia. Asian
airlines usually offer the same network and the same frequencies throughout the
year.
3.6 Yield
Most Asian carriers do not publish information about their yields. AAPA does
publish yield data, but only on an aggregate level. These figures can be somewhat
misleading as Asia is too big and too diverse to make a general statement about
yields in the region. Flights in and out of Tokyo are likely to earn high yields as
demand and purchasing power are both very high but supply limited due to fact that
the two Tokyo airports are heavily congested. On the other hand, flights between
Bangkok and Singapore will earn low yields since there are currently 8 fifth-freedom
carriers competing in this market at very low fares.
The following is an attempt to compare yields in Asia with yields in other parts
of the world. In order to do that, some generalizations and aggregations had to be
made.
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80 CNN, July 19, 2002
3.6.1 Domestic Yields
The following table gives an overview of the domestic yields as reported by
ATA, AEA and AAPA for 2002. A directory of member airlines of these airline
associations can be found in Appendix 2.1. Yield data is reported in US cents per
RPK and the average passenger haul (APH) in kilometers.
Domestic Yield Domestic APH
ATA 8.3 1,356
AEA 17.4 523
AAPA 11.0 779
Table 3.1: Domestic yield and domestic average passenger haul
With the United States being one of the geographically largest domestic
markets in this survey, it is not surprising that the average passenger haul of ATA
member airlines is longest. This has an obvious impact on US domestic yields, which
are lower than in Europe and Asia-Pacific. The link between short stage lengths and
low yields has been discussed in Chapter 2. The US domestic market was also one
of the markets to be liberalized earliest. Hence, competition has driven down fares
substantially. Between 1986 and 1995, Delta's yield declined 28%, or 2.5% each
year.
The two other regions have higher domestic yields, partly due to the shorter
average passenger haul. Furthermore, competition in Europe and Asia is not as
fierce as it is in the US. Japan, which accounts for more than half of total AAPA
domestic RPKs, has traditionally been a country with high air fares due to limited
competition, supply constraints (e.g. airport slots) and high levels of income.
Domestic yields in other countries in Asia tend to be significantly lower.
81 Winning Airlines - Productivity and Cost Competitiveness of the World's Major Airlines, Tae Hoon
Oum and Chunyan Yu, 1998
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3.6.2 System-Wide Yields
System-wide yield is the average yield across all scheduled commercial air
services an airline provides, both domestic and international.
System-Wide Yield System-Wide APH
ATA 6.0 1,685
AEA 9.3 2,015
AAPA 6.7 2,409
Table 3.3: System-wide yield and system-wide average passenger haul
Despite having the longest domestic APH, US carriers have the shortest
system-wide APH in this survey. This is mainly due to their very large domestic
operations. ATA airlines' short system-wide APH doesn't translate into having the
highest yield. Again, competition is extremely lively in the domestic US market. And
because it is the US government's policy to liberalize many international air service
agreements, also many international markets to/from the US are very competitive
(e.g. transatlantic markets).
Both AEA members and AAPA members have higher system-wide yields
despite having higher system-wide APHs than ATA airlines. Again, this is mainly due
to the fact that European and Asian carriers do not face the same level of competition
as US carriers do. AAPA airlines have a 20% higher APH compared to AEA airlines,
which explains part of the 38% difference in yield. The traffic mix for both groups of
airlines is about the same. AEA airlines carry 11.4% of their international passengers
in Business and Fist Class, AAPA airlines 14.4%.8 The main reason for AAPA's
lower yield is likely a combination of insignificant domestic traffic, lower levels of
income and the power of distribution intermediaries in Asia.
82 AEA Yearbook 2002, AAPA Statistical Report 2002
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3.6.3 Yields in Asia-Pacific
AAPA does not publish data on yields in Asia-Pacific. Neither do most Asian
airline companies. Only Singapore Airlines' financial reports offer some limited
insights into Asia-Pacific's yields. The company reports a yield for Asia-Pacific of USO
6.39, which is 28% higher than its system-wide yield. Of course the airline's average
passenger haul in Asia-Pacific (2,982km) is significantly shorter than its system-wide
APH (4,741km).
The following table compares Singapore Airlines' Asia-Pacific operations with
the operations of other airlines with a similar average passenger haul (APH).8
Yield APH
Singapore Airlines (Asia-Pacific) 6.39 2,982
British Airways (System-Wide) 10.25 2,915
KLM (System-Wide) 8.05 2,966
Air Canada (System-Wide) 7.65 2,890
Table 3.4: Yield and average passenger haul for selected major airlines
All these airlines have a similar APH and operate in a similar competitive
environment, with the exception of Air Canada, whose lower yield is primarily an
outcome of the high degree of competition the airline faces in many North American
markets.
Singapore Airlines' yield is 38% lower than BA's and 21 % lower than KLM's.
As mentioned in chapter 3.3, the strategic fleeting decision makes Singapore Airlines
fly its intra-Asia flights with wide-body aircraft. In order to fill this capacity, the airline
must stimulate additional demand (e.g. with lower fares) in order to achieve an
adequate load factor. This will lower the average intra-Asia yield. Singapore Airlines
also carriers a significant amount of connecting traffic originating/terminating outside
Asia. The formula the airline uses to pro-rate revenues from connecting passengers
also impacts the average yield on Asian routes.
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A recent study by Rigas Doganis presents the following data about yields
within the Far East, where Far East is not defined further. 4 The table shows yield
(USe per RPK), actual load factor as well as break-even load factor using 2000 IATA
data.
Yield Actual LF Break-Even LF
First Class 23.9 24% 108%
Business Class 18.7 49% 57%
Economy Class 8.6 74% 62%
Table 3.5: Yield and load factor data of different cabin classes
The survey does not explain the cost allocation strategy that was used to
obtain the break-even load factor. According to this survey, neither First Class nor
Business Class reach their respective break-even load factors. This suggests that it
costs the airlines more money to provide these services than they earn from them.
The break-even load factor for the First Class is over 100% and will therefore never
be achieved. The only service class that seems profitable is Economy Class. This
might suggest that Asian carriers should terminate their First Class services within
the Far East. Within North America and within Europe, most airlines have done this
already.
The same survey also examines services within Europe. A comparison is
shown in the following table. As there are virtually no First Class services within
Europe, only Business Class and Economy Class are included.
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83 Singapore Airline Annual Report 2002/2003, Reed Business Information (www.rati.com)
Within Europe Within Far East
Business Class LF 40% 49%
Business Class BELF 33% 57%
Business Class Yield 41.3 18.7
Economy Class LF 69% 74%
Economy Class BELF 80% 62%
Economy Class Yield 14.4 8.6
Table 3.6: Business Class vs. Economy Class in Europe and Far-East
While the survey suggests that within the Far East, Economy Class is
profitable and Business Class is not, the opposite seems to be true within Europe.
This is mainly due to the high Business Class fares within Europe. Business Class
travelers in Europe pay 187% more than in Economy Class. Within the Far East, the
mark-up is only 117%.
Business Class travelers in Europe pay 121% more than Business Class
travelers in Asia. For Economy Class the difference is 67%. However, some of this
difference is explained by the difference in average passenger haul, which is likely to
be higher in within the Far East than within Europe.
3.7 Airline Operating Costs
Appendix 2.4 gives an overview of airline operating costs per ATK in North
America, Europe and Asia. ATK was chosen over ASK because of the varying size of
the airlines' cargo operations. The figures show that both direct and indirect operating
expenses are significantly lower in Asia compared to the two other regions. Total unit
operating costs are 25% lower than in North America and 37% lower than in Europe.
Labor is one of the main drivers of airline operating costs. In most activities
that require a high level of labor input, Asian carriers therefore enjoy lower unit costs.
This is mainly due to the lower wage levels in many Asian economies. ATA member
airlines pay an average of USD 71,800 per employee; AAPA airlines pay USD 40,300
84 Flying Off Course, Rigas Doganis, 2002
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or 44% less.85 If one assumes that labor costs make up 25% of total operating costs,
44% lower labor costs result in 11 % lower total operating costs. Appendix 2.4 shows
that Asian carriers tend to have a cost advantage in all activities that require a high
level of labor input (e.g. maintenance and overhaul, station expenses). However,
although labor costs are generally lower in Asia, extreme differences exist among
Asian carriers. A flight attendant at Cathay Pacific earns ten times more than a flight
attendant at Philippine Airlines.86 Other airlines with relatively high labor costs include
JAL and All Nippon Airways, both from Japan.
Another major operating cost is fuel. Due to competing suppliers at many
airports and low taxes, fuel tends to be cheapest at North American airports.87 Prices
in Europe are about 2% higher; in Asia they are roughly 10% higher. These prices
can hardly be influenced by airlines. It is in the respective governments' hands to
allow multiple fuel providers at airports as well as to set fuel tax levels.
The data in Appendix 2.4 shows that Asian airlines pay 86% higher airport
charges per ATK than North American carriers. Asian airlines have a significant
longer average stage length, hence airport charges (which are not dependent on
stage length) should be lower. However, airport charges in the US tend to be very
low, thus US carriers have a significant cost advantage. Airport charges in Europe
are higher than in Asia. The landing fee and government taxes for a B747-400
aircraft at Singapore (USD 5,085), Bangkok (USD 5,376) and Hong Kong (USD
5,390) are all considerably lower than at Paris CDG (USD 6,673), Frankfurt (USD
8,276) or London-Heathrow (USD 15,063).88 Important exceptions in Asia are the
Japanese airports, with Tokyo-Narita charging USD 16,044.
Most other important costs do not vary significantly as the markets for aircraft,
capital etc. are relatively global, so differences in prices cannot be explained by
differences in geographical location. However, as Asian airlines tend to have a
relatively long average stage length and a relatively large average aircraft size, they
85 ATA Annual Report 2002, AAPA Statistical Report 2002
86 Flying Off Course, Rigas Doganis, 2002
87 Flying Off Course, Rigas Doganis, 2002
88 Flying Off Course, Rigas Doganis, 2002
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tend to have a unit cost advantage over North American and European carriers in
several cost items.
3.8 Distribution
3.8.1 Tour Operators
Because of language barriers, the collectivistic nature of Asian cultures and
inexperience in travel, many Asian travelers prefer to travel in a group when visiting
other countries. This is true for leisure travelers and to a lesser extent also for
business travelers. That's why many air tickets sold in Asia are part of a package
tour, organized by a tour operator.
With this arrangement, travelers have relatively little influence with what airline
they fly. Tour operators tend to choose the airline that offers them the most rewarding
financial incentive in the form of commissions and monetary kickbacks. This affects
the marketing and sales strategies of Asian airlines. Airline marketing in Asia has still
a strong focus on tour operators/travel agents rather than individual customers. While
in the US many airlines no longer pay commissions to tour operators and travel
agents, commissions are still an important part of the travel business in Asia.
3.8.2 Travel Agents
Unlike in Europe and North America, the Asian travel agent industry is
characterized by a large number of small independent travel agents. This is because
in most countries, it is easy to open a travel agency with many Asian countries not
requiring a license. The larger travel agencies usually have direct access to a CRS
system but may or may not issue ticket themselves. The smaller ones either book
directly with the airline or through a wholesaler. They earn money from sales
commissions, kickbacks from the airlines and/or fees collected from the traveler.
Most worldwide corporate travel agents (e.g. BTI or Carlson Wagonlit) have
offices throughout the region. These companies offer travel management services to
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large and medium-sized corporations that to not have their own in-house travel
department.
Both Europe and North America have seen many online travel agents starting
up within the last decade. In Asia, the only major international online travel agent is
zuji.com, which was created in 2002 by Travelocity together with 16 major airlines
operating in the region. It is currently operating in Australia, Hong Kong, Korea and
Singapore.
3.8.3 Wholesalers
The large number of small independent travel agents without access to a CRS
system justifies wholesales. Many airline offices do not have the capacity to deal with
the large number of requests from these small independent travel agents.
Wholesalers are intermediaries between the airlines and the travel agents. Like with
tour operators, the strong presence of wholesalers impacts the airlines' sales and
marketing strategies.
The business model of wholesalers is simple. Because they buy large volumes
from the airlines, they receive substantial discounts. They then pass part of these
discounts on to the individual travel agents. The result is that the airlines do not have
to deal with all travel agents, the wholesalers make money by keeping part of the
discounts and the travel agents get tickets at lower prices.
3.8.4 Direct Online Distribution
The internet has become an important distribution channel for the travel
industry in Europe and North America. With direct online distribution, an airline can
sell its tickets through its website. Usually, the bookings are directly fed into the
airline's internal reservation system, bypassing travel agents as well as CRS
providers. By doing this, an airline can reduce its distribution costs significantly.
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Continental cut distribution costs from 17.1% of sales in 1998 to 10.3% in 2002.9
This was mainly a result of bypassing travel agents and CRS providers, cutting
commissions as well as moving from paper tickets to electronic tickets.
Many major Asian airlines (e.g. Garuda Indonesia, Malaysian Airlines) do not
offer direct online distribution. Some (e.g. Thai Airways) have a booking engine on
their homepage but the bookings are routed via a conventional CRS, hence only
travel agents are bypassed, not the CRS providers. Only Asia's most advanced
airlines (e.g. Cathay Pacific, Singapore Airlines) make full use of direct online
distribution.
The main reason for this is that in many parts of Asia, the internet is not yet as
widely used as in Europe and North America. Appendix 2.5 shows that the level of
internet usage varies greatly among Asian nations. Of the 15 nations in the sample, 5
have a usage rate of 30% and higher, which is comparable to Europe and North
America. However, the majority of nations report rates of less than 5%. Also credit
card usage is less popular in Asia, which makes internet sales even less popular.
3.9 Infrastructure
3.9.1 Airports
With 51 million passengers a year, Tokyo's Haneda airport is the only airport in
Asia that ranks among the world's 20 busiest airports by passenger numbers.90 Other
major airports in Asia include Seoul (37 million), Hong Kong (32 million), Bangkok (28
million), Singapore (both 27 million) and Tokyo-Narita (25 million).91
Several of Asia's airports rank among the best in the industry. Singapore's
Changi Airport is OAG's "Airport of the Year 2003". Because many Asian airlines are
state-owned, governments like to invest heavily into airports partly to give their
national carrier a competitive advantage over other Asian airlines. This results in
89 Continental Airlines annual reports
90 Shaping Air Transport in Asia Pacific, Tae Hoon Oum and Chunyan Yu, 2000
91 ICAO 2002 data
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competition between airports. To some extent, airports have a natural geographical
monopoly. However, for cargo as well as connecting and transit passengers, this is
less true. Kuala Lumpur's KLIA airport reportedly convinced Egypt Air to move its
intermediate stop on its Cairo - Sydney flight from Singapore to Kuala Lumpur.92
Before the Asian Economic Crisis, many airports in the region were
experiencing capacity shortages of various dimensions. In Tokyo-Narita it was
runway capacity, in Beijing passenger processing capacity and in Bangkok aircraft
stand capacity. The Asian Economic Crisis gave some temporary relief as passenger
number dropped across Asia. Since then, many airports have increased their
capacity to be able to accommodate future traffic levels. Tokyo-Narita added an
additional runway, Beijing opened a new passenger terminal building and Bangkok is
about to build a brand new airport, due to open in 2005.
Flight delays in Asia-Pacific are less common than in North America or
Europe. At major airports in Asia-Pacific, an average of 14% of all flight departures
were delayed 15 minutes or more in 2001.93 The three most common causes were
"Airport and Government Authorities" (35%), "Reactionary/Consequential" (31%) and
"Technical/Damage of Aircraft" (12%). AEA airlines report that 24% of all intra-Europe
flights were delayed in 2001. The causes were very similar. And in the US, 21% of
all flight departures at the top 32 airports were delayed more than 15 minutes.95
3.9.2 Air Traffic Control
Air space congestion has been identified as a major issue of concern to the
international carriers and the most serious threat to the growth of traffic movement in
the region.96 ICAO has concluded that, given the high forecasted growth of air traffic
in Asia, the existing air traffic control systems will not be able to "support flight
operations at acceptable safety levels".
92 The Straits Times, March 29, 2002
93 AAPA Statistical Report 2002
94 AEA press release, November 13, 2002
95 Bureau of Transportation Statistics (www.bts.gov)
96 Shaping Air Transport in Asia Pacific, Tae Hoon Oum and Chunyan Yu, 2000
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Some Asian countries (e.g. China) open up relatively little airspace to
commercial aviation. Reasons for that include lack of ground-based navigational
infrastructure, large military use of airspace as well as political and cultural issues.
Although there are relatively few air traffic bottlenecks in Asia today, the high air
passenger growth numbers suggest that this might change soon.97 Regions currently
experiencing air traffic congestion include the area south of Japan, the area around
the Pearl River Delta as well as the South China Sea.
Seven different countries administer the airspace over the South China Sea,
each with its own air traffic control center and separation regulations. Analysts
suggest that congestion problems could be mitigated if individual countries would
work closer together in air traffic control matters. Both in North America and Europe,
the work of regional/national air traffic control centers is coordinated by a central flow
management unit.
3.10 Regulatory Issues
3.10.1 Bilateral Agreements
International air services are subject to bilateral agreements signed by the
state of origin and state of destination. Traditionally, these agreements specified the
capacity, frequency, routes, designated carriers, fares and other parameters of all air
services between the two nations. They are usually based on the concept of
reciprocity; hence traffic rights are exchanged equally between the two countries.
Most bilateral agreements between Asian nations are of this traditional kind.
With such tight regulations, it is not surprising that the environment in which airlines
operate is not very competitive. The carriers involved do not really compete with each
other and new entrants are generally not allowed. North American and European
governments increasingly adopt more liberal (bilateral or multi-lateral) open-skies
97 Air Traffic Congestion and Infrastructure Development in the Pacific Asia Region, Paul Stephen
Dempsey and Kevin O'Connor, 1996
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agreements. The reasons for why this has not yet happened in Asia will be discussed
in the following section.
3.10.2 Towards Open Skies?
Many countries in Asia have started to sign open-skies agreements with other
countries outside Asia, particularly with the US. Liberalization of bilateral agreements
within Asia is still in its infancy. One of the major reasons of this is that the countries
and their respective aviation industries vary significantly across the continent.
Singapore has only one major international airport. So if Singapore opens its
skies, it in fact opens up just one airport. Furthermore, its carriers are relatively
competitive; hence they will likely be able to survive in an increased competitive
environment. If China opens its skies, it would open many international airports, not
just one. Hence, an open-skies agreement between China and Singapore would be
very imbalanced. Furthermore, Chinese carriers are less competitive than
Singapore's. In a competitive environment, the Chinese carriers will likely lose over
Singapore's carriers. Consequently, it will be very difficult to liberalize the bilateral air
services agreement between Singapore and China.
In other parts of the world, these differences didn't stop nations from signing
open skies agreements. For instance, the US was willing to negotiate open skies
agreements with many smaller nations like Austria or Denmark that have only one
major international airport. However, US airlines were very competitive; hence they
would likely benefit from a more liberal air service agreement. Furthermore, even
under the open-skies regime, the US opened up only several airports to these
smaller countries.
The differences between Asian countries will be more difficult to overcome.
Airline of large countries (e.g. China, India) gain relatively little market access by
signing an open skies agreement with smaller nations (e.g. Singapore, Malaysia). In
addition to that, it happens that the competitiveness of airlines from smaller nations
tends to be relatively high; hence large countries face the additional disadvantage of
endangering their own carriers by signing more liberal open skies agreements.
71
However, Asian countries do have an interest in opening up their skies.
Tourism is an important industry in many Asian countries and many governments
want to develop tourism further. Evidence suggests that an open skies agreement
and the resulting competitive environment will increase traffic between two nations.98
Hence, governments do have an interest in signing open skies agreements for the
purpose of stimulating tourism. The first open-skies agreement among Asian nations
was signed in 1999 by the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.99
However, the aviation industries of these three countries are similar. And although
there are no capacity or frequency restrictions, the agreement does not apply to all
airports in these three nations.
The differences in Asia could be overcome if aviation was not treated
separately from other industry sectors. The EU Treaty of Rome was a package of
free trade agreements that included aviation. EU countries could not opt out of the
common market for an individual industry. So although the national aviation
industries were very different, all countries adopted the package of free trade
agreements and the liberalized multi-lateral air service agreement with it. This could
potentially work in Asia, with ASEAN or APEC taking the lead.
3.11 Growing Demand for Air Transportation in Asia
Appendix 2.4 gives an overview of the expected annual population growth
rates until 2015 of various Asian countries. Many populations will grow by more than
1 % each year. India's growth rate of 1.3% means that the country's population will
grow by more than 13 million each year. Except for Japan and Korea, all countries in
the list are forecasted to grow more than 0.5%, which is the expected annual
population growth rate of OECD countries.100 However, evidence suggests that
population segments with low incomes tend to grow faster than high-income
segments. In Asia, a 1% growth in population will therefore most likely not result in air
passenger growth of 1 %. It will be somewhat lower.
98Flying Off Course, Rigas Doganis, 2002
99 Shaping Air Transport in Asia Pacific, Tae Hoon Oum and Chunyan Yu, 2000
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Income is another important driver of air transportation. Evidence suggests
that the percentage of money spent on travel increases as disposable income grows.
Hence, if GDP per capita grows by 1%, demand for air transportation will grow by
more than 1%, all else staying equal. Appendix 2.6 shows the growth rates in GDP
per capita in various Asian countries. The income in all major Asian economies are
growing significantly higher than the growth rate of OECD nations, which averages
1.7%.101 And despite the ongoing global economic slowdown, most forecasts predict
continuously high GDP growth rates all across Asia.
Another important factor that affects the demand for air transportation is the
level of fares. Like in most other markets for goods and services, lower air fares will
stimulate demand for air transportation. Fares can decrease by a variety of reasons,
e.g. increased competition, lower fuel prices or increased productivity due to
privatization. Most Asian carriers have seen their yields falling during the last decade.
Singapore Airlines' system-wide yield decreased 12% from US0 5.9 to US0 5.2
between 1993/1994 and 2002/2003.102 Both IATA and Boeing forecast yields to
continue decreasing across the region. This will make air transportation affordable to
more people in Asia and encourage existing customers to fly more often.
Many Asian countries relax travel restrictions, both for their own nationals as
well as for incoming visitors. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
has plans to be visa-free for all ASEAN citizens.1 0 3 This will most likely further
stimulate the demand for intra-Asia air transportation. Also China will become a major
outgoing tourism market. The government's decision to relax travel restrictions marks
a significant change from the 1980s, when passports were limited to the few who
went on official trips and those who were well connected. 104
Major Asian tourist destinations have traditionally targeted oversees tourist to
visit their resorts. It is only recently that Asian countries have initiated large tourism
promotion campaigns in other Asian countries. Most Asian couldn't afford to travel
abroad, hence it made little sense to promote intra-Asia tourism. The people from
100 UNDP Human Development Indicators 2003
101 UNDP Human Development Indicators 2003
102 Using 2003 exchange rates, not taking into account inflation
103 TTG Asia, February 20, 2003
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Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore did have the money to travel but usually did so in
groups, which also didn't require much tourism promotion. But as incomes are now
on the rise and people from Japan and other countries start to explore the continent
more individualistically, tourism promotion becomes more important. PATA (Pacific-
Asia Travel Association) is also increasingly shifting its focus towards promoting
intra-Asia tourism.
3.12 Challenges for Asian Airlines
3.12.1 Keeping the Cost Advantage
Apart from the two major Japanese airlines, most other major airlines in Asia
have unit costs that are significantly lower compared to major European and North
American airlines. The main season for this is lower input costs, particularly with
regard to labor costs. Singapore Airlines' unit labor costs are USO 0.77 per ASK
whereas American Airlines reports USO 2.92 per ASK, 279% more.' 05 The same is
true for many other Asian airlines.
However, some Asian airlines are losing their cost competitiveness vis-a-vis
their European and North American competitors. Singapore's GDP per capita has
been growing at an average annual rate of 8.1% in recent years. 106 Hong Kong's
GDP per capita is already the 11th highest in the world. 107 Incomes are on the rise
throughout Asia, which translates into increasing labor cost for the region's airlines.
This is an important issue and some airlines have been very active in finding
strategies to solve the problem. Cathay Pacific currently employs many flight
attendants from low-income countries like the Philippines as flight attendants from
Hong Kong have become too expensive. But as incomes are on the rise in virtually
any country in Asia, this strategy just delays the problem.
104 CNN, September 8, 2003
105 2002 Annual Reports (not adjusted for stage length, different aircraft size etc.)
106 World Economic Forum 2003 data
107 UNDP 2001 data
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The answer to the problem must lie in productivity growth. If input prices
cannot be influenced, the only way to contain unit costs is by increasing labor
productivity. Is there evidence that Asian carriers are less productive? Oum and Yu
(1996) suggest there is. Their study shows that if Thai Airways had to pay the same
level of input prices as American Airlines, it would have unit costs 43% higher than
American Airlines.
3.12.2 Continued Pressure on Yield
In addition to increasing costs, Asian airlines will also have to face decreasing
yields. According to both IATA and Boeing, worldwide airline yields will decrease
1.1 % per year until 2010 and analysts expect intra-Asia yields to decrease much
faster than that. 10 8 If low-cost airlines will successfully enter markets in Asia, it is very
likely that this will drive yields down even further.
Because the environment will become increasingly competitive, it is unlikely
that Asian airlines will be able to defend their current yield levels. Hence if airlines
want to keep their level of profitability, they must carefully manage their costs. But as
costs are rising too, one might conclude that the profitability of Asian airlines might
decrease over the coming years.
3.12.3 Liberalization
As discussed earlier, governments have incentives to liberalize their national
aviation industries, e.g. to promote tourism. While consumers are likely to profit from
a more liberal and competitive market for air transportation, not all airlines in the
region will welcome it.
Airlines that are generally regarded as competitive today (e.g. Singapore
Airlines) tend to be in favor of a more liberal market environment as their competitive
advantage would enable them to dominate the market. But many Asian airlines may
currently not be competitive enough to survive in a fully competitive environment. For
108 Shaping Air Transport in Asia Pacific, Tae Hoon Oum and Chunyan Yu, 2000
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these airlines, liberalized markets will pose a considerable threat to their survival.
Even successful airlines like JAL might turn out to be not competitive. JAL's unit
costs are almost twice as high as Singapore Airlines' unit cost. Generally, major
airlines in other parts of the world do not differ as much in unit cost as airlines in Asia
do. Appendix 2.7 lists the unit cost and other relevant data of 41 airlines around the
world. The standard deviation in unit cost is greatest among Asian carriers.
3.12.4 Shifting Markets
The northern hemisphere accounts for most of the worldwide air traffic. The
same is true for Asia, with major markets like Japan and Korea located in the north of
the continent. The rapid economic growth of China and India will likely shift traffic
movements further up north in Asia. Many major Asian carriers, including Singapore
Airlines and Malaysia Airlines have hubs that are at the extreme south of the
continent. While this location is desirable to serve market like Europe - Australia, it is
less desirable for the markets where significant future growth is expected. Markets
like USA - China or Europe - India cannot be efficiently served by many South-East
Asian carriers. Unless these airlines can secure fifth freedom traffic rights, they will
likely miss out on these opportunities.
3.13 Summary
Asia's airlines operate in a different market environment. Also the regulatory
frameworks are different in Asia compared to the ones known in North America and
Europe. More fundamentally, the raison-d'etre of some Asian airlines is different as
the main objective may be to support the national agenda as opposed to posting a
profit.
Apart from Japanese carriers, Asian airlines tend to have relatively low unit
costs, a result of low input costs, large aircraft sizes and long stage-lengths. Yields
vary significantly across airlines and markets; hence aggregations tend to be
misleading. The fleet of major Asian airlines is characterized by a large percentage of
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wide-body aircraft. Networks are mostly all hub-and-spoke networks, usually less
dense than networks in Europe or North America. Flight frequencies tend to be low.
Asian airlines differ significantly among themselves. Asia is home to some of
the most profitable and most respected airlines in the world. At the same time, there
are many Asian carriers, that struggle and whose future is very uncertain. Therefore,
general statements about the Asian airline industry can be misleading.
Although several one-time events in recent years temporarily brought growth to
a standstill, air traffic is widely expected to growth significantly in Asia in the
foreseeable future. Income is rising in most Asian economies, the population is
growing and travel restrictions disappearing for many travelers. Markets like China
and India will open up additional opportunities for Asian airlines.
But there are also challenges ahead. Rising costs and declining yields will
have severe impacts on the profitability of Asian airlines. And as the environment will
continue to become more competitive, some airlines might not survive. One of these
challenges will be the potential emergence of low-cost airlines in Asia.
Chapter 4 will now examine in what ways the nature of competition, the market
environments and the regulatory frameworks discussed in this chapter allow low-cost
airlines to emerge in Asia.
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4. Opportunities and Challenges for Low-Cost Airlines in Asia
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, the low-cost airline business model is very flexible
and has been successfully adapted to the local environments of various countries in
North America and Europe. However, in many ways, Asia is different. As the previous
Chapter explained, the airline industry in Asia has some very distinct characteristics
that cannot be found in either North America or Europe. This Chapter will discuss the
obstacles that potential low-cost airlines in Asia will have to overcome as well as the
opportunities that Asia has to offer to these airlines.
Low-cost airlines in Asia will face challenges that other LCAs around the world
do not have to deal with. Competing with traditional airlines that have some of the
world's lowest unit costs, the rigid regulatory frameworks, congested airports and
several other issues are major factors that will fundamentally affect the viability of
operating a low-cost airline in Asia.
Despite these obstacles, Asia offers many opportunities that might appeal to
potential low-cost airlines. Monopolies of flag carriers are disappearing, national and
international regulations are becoming more liberal and the fact that intra-Asia traffic
is forecasted to grow significantly has already spurred several new entrants that are
keen on making the LCA business model work in Asia.
The airline industry has many stakeholders. Low-cost airlines, traditional
airlines, operators of other modes of transport, airports, regulatory authorities,
passengers etc. will all try to influence the future of the industry in their favor. Many of
these stakeholders have conflicting interests. Although the outcome is far from being
clear, the Asian airline industry will likely become more competitive than it used to be.
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4.2 Markets
4.2.1 Market Characteristics
Although the services might be produced jointly, airlines usually offer service in
many different markets, each with its own distinct characteristics. Depending on
these market characteristics, an airline will decide whether to enter a specific market
or not.
In the airline industry, a market can be defined in several ways.
Geographically, markets can be described on an airport level (e.g. New York JFK -
London Heathrow), on a city level (e.g. New York - London) or on a regional level
(North America - Europe). Markets can also be defined by consumer segment (e.g.
the people who visit friends and relatives). Other frequently-used market distinctions
include domestic vs. international and short haul vs. medium haul.
As described in Chapter 2, some of the key elements of the LCA model are the
reason why LCAs tend to favor certain types of markets. The LCA business model
tends to work best in very liberal environments; hence, as international markets tend
to be more heavily regulated than domestic markets, the distinction between
domestic and international markets is a very important one for LCAs. In addition to
that, because certain passengers are more likely to be attracted by the lower fares
than others, LCAs find it useful to look at potential markets by consumer segments.
The following sections will therefore examine the distinction between domestic and
international markets as well as the distinction between leisure and business markets
in the Asian context.
4.2.2 Domestic vs. International
Many low-cost airlines around the word started as domestic operators and
several major LCAs limit their operations to domestic flights even after several years
in business (e.g. Southwest). As discussed in Chapter 2, the main obstacle in
entering international markets is that an airline needs to obtain the relevant traffic
rights. Several LCAs in North America and Europe do fly international routes. This is
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a result of substantial bilateral deregulation of international air transportation in both
regions. Asia is very different in this respect. So far, there are very few liberal bilateral
air services agreements within Asia. And most traffic rights that countries have
negotiated between them are used by traditional airlines. LCAs in Asia might
therefore find it difficult to enter international markets.
Another reason why LCAs tend to favor domestic operations is that flights are
generally shorter. For the reasons explained in Chapter 2, LCAs tend to serve city
pairs with relatively short stage lengths. Most flights of low-cost airlines in North
America and Europe are shorter than three hours. In Asia, the flying time between
major cities can be significantly more than three hours. Of AAPA's top 20
international city pairs by passenger numbers, almost half are more than three hours
flying time apart. 109 This might discourage many LCAs to enter these international
markets.
Also, competition in domestic markets in Asia tends to be less fierce than in
international markets. Many international markets in Asia are served by at least two
carriers nonstop (usually one from each country) as well as by several additional
airlines that offer connecting services. But domestically, in many Asian countries, the
flag carrier used to be the only operator. As a result, domestic flights tended to be
overpriced and of poor service quality. As some of these domestic markets are about
to be deregulated to a substantial extent, they might be very attractive for potential
LCAs.
4.2.3 Leisure Markets
As discussed in Chapter 2, many LCAs around primarily target leisure
markets. Asia will probably not be any different. According to the Pacific Asian Travel
Association (PATA), short-haul intra-Asia leisure traffic will increase substantially
over the next decade. 10 Increasing disposable incomes, fewer travel restrictions and
the development of new leisure destinations are forecasted to significantly stimulate
109 AAPA Statistical Report (2002), OAG (2003)
110 The Bangkok Post, July 15, 2003
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intra-Asia leisure traffic. This makes the Asian leisure market very attractive for low-
cost airlines.
Many major Asian cities like Bangkok and Hong Kong are both origins and
destinations of leisure traffic. Other cities like Seoul or Singapore tend to see more
outgoing than incoming leisure traffic. And islands like Phuket or Bali will
predominantly be net tourist receivers, which could make them important destinations
for LCAs.
Leisure traffic in North America and Europe tends to see a relatively high
degree of peaking and seasonality. Because of cultural/religious reasons, the entire
population of these regions enjoys their holidays at the same time. Asia is culturally
and politically more diverse, leisure traffic tends to be more evenly distributed. This is
desirable for LCAs, in terms of being to offer the same capacity year-round.
A fair amount of leisure traffic in Europe is carried by charter airlines. As in
Asia there are virtually no charter airlines, traditional airlines accommodate most of
this traffic. But as leisure traffic is relatively price-sensitive, many of those passengers
might switch to LCAs as their fares are likely going to be significantly cheaper.
4.2.4 Business Markets
Although most LCAs offer significantly fewer amenities likes airport lounges,
business/first class cabins etc. and although business traffic tends to be less price-
sensitive than leisure traffic, many LCAs do cater to some sub-segments of the
business market. Will potential Asian LCAs be able to do the same?
Economic activity in Asia is not as dispersed as it is in North America and
Europe. For instance, Manila accounts for 15% of the Filipino population but
accounts for over one third of the country's GDP."' Hence, most business traffic in
Asia travels in and out of major cities. Asian LCAs will therefore have to offer services
between these major cities in order to target a substantial amount of business
travelers. However, the airports of these major cities tend to be congested and
1 The Economist Country Intelligence Unit (www.economist.com)
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charge relatively high user charges. And as will be discussed later, secondary
airports are usually not an option.
If low-cost airlines started services between major Asian cities, would business
travelers have an incentive to switch to LCAs? As the analysis in Chapter 3 showed,
business fares in Europe are significantly higher than leisure fares. As shown in
Chapter 3, this markup tends to be substantially lower in Asia. This might suggest
that business travelers in Asia save less than European business travelers by
switching from traditional airlines to LCAs.
4.3 Competing Modes of Transport
4.3.1 Car
On shorter flights of up to one hour, LCAs in North America and Europe
compete with the car to some degree. For several reasons, even for short distances,
competition from the car will be very limited in Asia.
Appendix 2.5 shows that car ownership is relatively low in many parts of Asia.
While in most Western nations, there are more than 300 cars per 1,000 inhabitants,
the number for most Asian countries is less than 100.112 In addition to that, road
infrastructure is relatively poor in many Asian countries, particularly long-distance
roads. And as discussed earlier, for many Asian city pairs, ground transportation is
not an option as the cities might be on different islands.
4.3.2 Bus
Since a large percentage of the population in Asia is relatively poor, for most
people, the cost of travel is more important than the convenience of travel. In many
parts of Asia, public and private buses are therefore among the most popular means
of intercity transportation. However, distances tend to be long and road conditions
relatively poor. So will LCAs in Asia be able to compete with buses?
1 World Development Indicators 2002 (The Worldbank)
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Malaysia's LCA AirAsia flies from Johor Bahru (a 90 minutes drive from
downtown Singapore) to Kuala Lumpur's KLIA (a 60 minutes drive from downtown
Kuala Lumpur). Including ground transportation and the time spent at the airports, the
total journey time from Singapore to Kuala Lumpur is about 4.5 hours. There are
several bus companies that provide nonstop downtown-to-downtown services
between the two cities at roughly the same time and at lower costs. Hence, AirAsia
might find it difficult to compete with the bus on this specific route.
There are several Thai start-up airlines that announced low-cost services
between Bangkok and Chiang Mai starting at under USD 26.113 The downtown-to-
downtown travel time will be approximately 4 hours. Several bus operators raised
concerns that competition from LCAs might drive them out of business. 14 An up-
market express bus on the same route costs USD 16 and takes around 9 hours.
Although only a limited number of seats will be sold at the USD 26 fare, a substantial
amount of travelers might switch from buses to LCAs. Traditional airlines like Thai
Airways charge more than USD 50 for the same trip. Hence, travelers that are willing
to pay USD 25 to 50 for the trip are traveling by bus today, but may choose to fly
once LCAs enter the market.
The two examples show that whether LCAs will be able to draw away
passenger from bus operators will depend on the circumstances. The longer the
distance, the poorer the bus service and the smaller the cost difference, the more
likely bus passengers are going to switch to LCAs.
4.3.3 Rail
There is no significant international rail traffic in Asia as there are very few rail
links between countries. However, railways do get a fair amount of domestic intercity
traffic in many Asian countries. Apart from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, service
is relatively cheap but tends to be inconvenient and relatively unreliable. Many
railway companies are government-owned and receive substantial amounts of
113 The Bangkok Post, November 12, 2003 (THB 999 airfare plus THB 100 tax)
114 The Bangkok Post, November 14, 2003
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subsidies. A train ticket from Bangkok to Chiang Mai costs USD 4 to 30, depending
on the class of travel and type of train.'15 The trip takes from 12 to 15 hours. LCAs
are expected to offer fares as low as USD 26. Some of the first class rail passengers
that value convenience and travel time might therefore start flying. The State Railway
of Thailand (SRT) expects that LCAs will substantially impact its long-distance
business and plans to offer substantial discounts on the affected routes. 16
4.3.4 Ship/Ferry
For overland journeys, cars, buses and trains are relatively fast and
convenient. For trips across large areas of water, surface-based transportation
modes tend to be slow and rather inconvenient; hence travelers are more willing to
switch to air transportation, particularly if it is easily affordable. As the cost difference
between a ferry ticket and a ticket for a traditional airline is relatively high, the two
modes do not compete for the same customers. However, as LCAs enter the market,
this might change. One of the reasons why the UK and Ireland were the first
countries in Europe to be served extensively by LCAs was their geographical location
off the coast of Continental Europe.
The same pattern emerges in Asia. The first country in Asia that was served
by a low-cost airline was Malaysia, a country with provinces on the continent, on the
Island or Borneo as well as on several smaller islands. Most of the flights of
Malaysian LCA AirAsia are indeed flights that connect cities on the continent to cities
on the country's islands.
Several other countries including Japan and Taiwan are also off the coast of
continental Asia. Hence, these countries might be potential markets to be served by
LCAs. In addition to that, Indonesia and the Philippines are archipelagos. For most
city pairs in these nations, the only mode of surface transportation that will compete
with LCAs is the ferry, which tends to be cheap, but also slow, unreliable and
115 State Railway of Thailand homepage (www.railway.co.th)
116 Financial Times Information (www.fnWeb.com), November 17, 2003
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inconvenient. The ferry passengers that value time and convenience might therefore
be willing to switch to a low-cost air alternative.
4.4 Competing Against Traditional Airlines
4.4.1 Cost Competitiveness
As discussed earlier, many of Asia's major airlines have relatively low unit
costs, compared globally. Asian LCAs will be able to enjoy many cost advantages
that these traditional Asian carriers enjoy, e.g. low labor costs. However, some of the
cost advantages of traditional Asian carrier will not be transferable to LCAs. For
instance, the fact that most traditional Asian carriers use large aircraft on many intra-
Asian flights has some important implications.
As discussed in Chapter 2, LCAs tend to favor narrow-body aircraft of around
150 seats. This could mean that LCAs will offer more frequencies than traditional
airlines on a given route. From a consumer's point-of-view, this is favorable and
might force traditional Asian airlines to do the same. However, small aircraft tend to
have significantly higher unit costs than large aircraft. At Continental Airlines, the
aircraft operating costs for their 283-seat B777-200 are USD 6,361 per hour or USD
22.1 per seat-hour.1 7 Flying their 124-seat B737-300 costs Continental USD 3,617
per hour or USD 29.2 per seat-hour. Hence, on a per-seat-hour basis, the B737-300
is 29,8% more expensive than a B777-200.
However, substantial amount of these cost savings are due to the longer
stage-lengths that large aircraft tend to fly. If both a B737-300 and a B777-200 flew
the same route, the cost difference would be somewhat smaller. Still, even on the
same route, large aircraft tend to have lower unit operating costs than small planes.
Doganis shows that for the same 3,000km trip, a 300-seat A340-600 has more than
10% lower unit operating costs (per ATK) than a 150-seat A320-200.118
117 US DOT Form 41 data (2003)
118 Flying Off Course, Rigas Doganis, 2002
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Aircraft operating costs are major contributor to an airline's overall costs. It
might be difficult for LCAs to make up that difference in cost items other than aircraft
operating costs. On the other hand, the it could also be that the increased
competition from LCAs might force traditional Asian airlines to start competing on
frequency; hence use smaller aircraft, too.
Many North American and European LCAs use their aircraft more hours each
day than their established competitors. This results in substantial savings in unit
ownership costs. But in Asia, many traditional carriers also use their aircraft
extensively as they operate many long-haul routes. Asian LCAs might therefore not
enjoy the same unit ownership cost advantage.
This discrepancy in aircraft size is an important difference between Asia and
other parts of the world. Both in Europe and North America, traditional airlines and
LCAs use similar aircraft sizes in many market in which they compete. In Asia,
traditional airlines will have the cost-advantage of using larger aircraft. Plus, as
discussed in Chapter 3, Asian airlines fly intra-Asia routes at relatively low load
factors, usually around 60-70%.119 Hence, they could match or even undercut the
fares of their low-cost competitors without adding any additional capacity. This makes
this form of retaliation very likely. A full discussion of how traditional Asian carriers
could respond to the LCA phenomenon will follow in Chapter 5.
4.4.2 Connecting Passengers
Because Asia has only a very limited number of intercontinental gateways, a
substantial part of intra-Asia traffic originates or terminates outside Asia. A passenger
flying from Phnom Penh to Bangkok might actually connect in Bangkok to an
intercontinental flight bound for London. Since Asian LCAs will not offer
intercontinental services anytime soon, they will not be able to compete for such
traffic on intra-Asia flights. Since LCAs usually do not work together with traditional
airlines, it is very unlikely that a connecting passenger will fly his/her intra-Asia
segment on an LCA and then connect to an intercontinental flight of a traditional
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119 see Chapter 3.4
airline. Asian LCAs will only be able to compete for traffic that originates and
terminates within Asia. And as explained earlier, this competition will be fiercest on
flights of under three hours.
With the demise of Ansett Australia, Singapore Airlines lost its partner that
provided domestic feeder flights from secondary Australian cities to SIA's gateway
cities. Since Qantas and Virgin Blue are the only two airlines that provide reasonably
good network coverage in the domestic Australian market and because Qantas is
member of the oneWorld alliance, Singapore Airlines and other Star alliance
members showed interest in working together with Virgin Blue.120 Virgin Blue
reported it was considering its options carefully but eventually declined.121 But since
SIA and Virgin Blue do not compete in the same markets, such a cooperation might
make sense for both parties.
4.4.3 Competing with Flag Carriers
It is very likely that LCAs in Asia will compete with established Asian carriers
that are state-owned and that may or may not receive subsides or preferential
treatment from their respective governments. Privately-held Malaysian LCA AirAsia
has already complained several times that government-backed Malaysia Airlines is
using tax-money to cut fares.12 2 While in North America and Europe several low-cost
airlines have sued traditional airlines over alleged predatory pricing and predatory
capacity conduct, similar law-suits may turn out to be very difficult in Asia as the legal
systems are generally not as elaborate with regard to rules on fair competition. It will
likely depend on the government's view on the issue as well as on the nature of the
government-airline relationship whether flag carriers are allowed to use tax money to
cut fares in order to compete with private airlines.
Aviation Daily, July 25, 2002
Traveltrade (Australia), March 5, 2002
1 The Financial Times (London), October 14, 2003
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4.5 Airports
4.5.1 Secondary Airports
As discussed in Chapter 2, servicing secondary airports results in significant
cost advantages for low-cost airlines. Landing fees and other airport charges are
lower than at primary airports. As secondary airports tend to be less congested, the
possibility that flights are delayed is much lower. This has positive implications on the
airline's aircraft utilization. Secondary airports also tend to be smaller which results in
shorter taxi times; hence shorter turnaround times.
In the United States, most people have a car and driving is relatively cheap
and convenient. Consequently, many passengers are willing to drive substantial
amounts of time to reach a secondary airport that is served by one or more low-cost
airlines. Europe is less car-focused. However, public transportation is well developed
and secondary airports can usually be reached relatively easily by bus or train.
Asia is somewhat different. While there is usually a serviceable secondary
airport within 100km of every major city in the US and in Europe, secondary airports
are less widespread in Asia. Airports in Asia were mainly built to accommodate
intercontinental flights. There was little reason to build smaller airports, except for
military purposes.
The best alternative to Hong Kong's main airport would be Macao, which is a
two hours ferry/bus journey away. Singapore's secondary airport has a runway too
short to accommodate an A319 or B737.123 The only feasible alternative is Johor
Bahru across the border in Malaysia, a 90 minutes car ride away from downtown
Singapore. Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok do not have suitable secondary airports at
all. The same is true for several other major Asian airports.
However, Asian LCAs need to serve large cities, as traffic between two
secondary Asian cities might be too low to justify point-to-point services. In many of
Asia's large cities, congested and expensive primary airports will be the only option
for these airlines. At smaller cities, the problem is not as severe. Although they
123 Channel News Asia, October 14, 2003
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usually do not have secondary airports either, congestion tend to be less of a
problem, airport charges are lower and turnaround times can be kept to a minimum.
4.5.2 Airport Charges
One reason why low-cost airlines choose secondary airports is the lower
airport charges. The main components of the charges that an airline incurs at an
airport are landing fee, parking fee and handling fee. As discussed in Chapter 3,
landing fees in Asia are significantly higher than in the US. However, both LCAs and
traditional airlines are charged the same fees at a given airport. Hence, the higher
fees at Asian airports will not affect the competition between LCAs and traditional
airlines.
Many airports in Asia have been built to accommodate large aircraft that serve
intercontinental routes. The B737 of an LCA might therefore have to use the same
parking position that could accommodate a much larger B747. If airports become
congested - and several major Asian airports are - airport authorities have an
incentive to use of the airport more efficiently. This could mean the establishment of
policies and fees to discourage the use of smaller aircraft. Since a small aircraft uses
up approximately the same airside capacity than a large aircraft, but seats fewer
passengers, large aircraft make more efficient use of an airport's existing airside
capacity.12 1
4.5.3 Airport Slots
Unlike most airports in North America, virtually every major airport in Asia is
slot-controlled. Every airport has a certain maximum number of aircraft it can handle
per hour. In order to ensure that demand does not exceed capacity during any given
time period, airlines have to obtain the right to land and take-off at an airport during a
specified time window, called "slot". At several important airports in Asia, it is difficult
to obtain these slots as most of them have already been granted and are used by the
124 An airport's airside capacity includes tarmac, taxiways, runway, and surrounding airspace.
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various airlines. IATA's system of grandfather rights means that it is very difficult for
new airlines to start serving these airports.
In Europe, where most major airports are also slot-controlled, the European
Commission views the system of grandfather rights as a major factor restricting the
opening up of new routes and services. New regulations therefore require airports to
set up a pool of slots that "contain newly created slots, unused slots and slots which
have been given up by a carrier " and that "50 % of these slots shall be allocated to
new entrants".125
Asia is still a long way from adopting such competition-friendly regulation that
supports new entrants. The lack of available slots, particularly during peak times,
might therefore be a major obstacle for Asian LCAs. Since IATA is mainly sponsored
by established airlines, it will have relatively little incentive to take the lead in opening
up slot-controlled airports to LCAs. APEC or ASEAN will have to address this
problem. But since fighting poverty and other problems are more urgent economic
issues, the slot problem is not likely going to be addressed anytime soon.
4.5.4 Increased Congestion due to LCAs?
A significant part of flights within Asia are operated by wide-body aircraft.
LCAs in Asia will most likely use significantly smaller aircraft, e.g. the B737 or A320
families of aircraft. Hence, if LCAs will compete for the traffic that is currently carried
in wide-body aircraft, the number of flights will increase since the same number of
passengers will be being carried in more aircraft. This could potentially lead to
congestion problems in the air as well as on the ground because to a large extent a
B737 uses up the same airport and airspace capacity than a much larger B747.
125 Article 10 of Council Regulation 95/93/EC
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4.6 Policy Issues
4.6.1 National Interests regarding LCAs
Many airlines in Asia are state-owned; hence governments have an interest in
creating a regulatory environment that supports the national carrier. Policies that
support the national carrier have so far been in line with the broader goal of
supporting the national economy. However, with the emergence of LCAs, this is likely
going to change. Supporting only the national carrier might no longer be in the best
interest of a nation.
A microeconomic theory that is based on a hypothesis developed by Adam
Smith suggests that a fully competitive market where all parties have perfect
information maximizes social welfare.126 A fully competitive market with perfectly
informed decision-makers is an abstract concept that cannot exist in reality. However,
the theory suggests that, the more competitive a market is, the more desirable the
outcome for the economy as a whole.
As discussed in Chapter 3, many markets for air transportation in Asia are not
very competitive mainly because of tight economic regulation of the airline industry as
well as because there is usually only a very limited number of suppliers in each
market. The following table shows the annual "possible cost savings from competitive
aviation service in 2010" for selected Asian countries as estimated by Findlay and
Clyde in 1997.127
126 Microeconomic Theory, Walter Nicholson, 1995
127 Flying High - Liberalizing Civil Aviation in Asia Pacific, Gary Clyde Hofbauer and Christopher
Findlay, 1997
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Annual User Cost Savings
(USD billions)
Hong Kong 2.2
Japan 9.4
South Korea 3.9
Malaysia 1.0
Singapore 2.7
Table 4.1: Estimated annual user cost savings of selected Asian nations
The cost savings would be achieved mainly by "forcing leaner airline
operations and route rationalizations" which would turn into increased "trade and
tourism". The figures represent only the additional consumer benefit. The decreased
producer benefit due to lost monopoly profits is not taken into consideration.
However, the authors suggest that in the long run, the increase in consumer benefits
will be significantly higher than the decrease in producer benefits. This would suggest
a net increase in social welfare due to a more competitive market for air
transportation in Asia.
However, for many Asian nations this will mean to expose the national carrier
to an increasingly competitive environment in which these airlines are likely going to
suffer in terms of profitability. So although economically optimal, a fully competitive
aviation environment might not be in the interest of a country. The new benefits that
LCAs bring in terms of lower cost for air travel might be outweighed by the dis-
benefits of having a weak national carrier. Ireland created an environment that
encouraged the start-up and growth of low-cost airlines. Although the nation
benefited from lower airfares, Aer Lingus, the national carrier, suffered substantially
on European routes. And as European traffic was needed to support the airline's
intercontinental network, Aer Lingus' number of intercontinental destinations
gradually declined. Today, only 5 destinations remain in the airline's intercontinental
network. 128 For many Asian nations, being linked to economies in Europe and North
128 Aer Lingus Homepage (www.aerlingus.com)
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America is vital. Asian governments might therefore justify continued preferential
treatment and/or subsidies for their national carrier.
4.6.2 Government Policies regarding Airports
The main reason why Asian governments built airports was to support the
local tourism industry and the local businesses. As both tourism and business was
focused on trade with North America and Europe, airports were built as
intercontinental airports. Even today, virtually every new airport in Asia is a multi-
billion dollar intercontinental gateway. Kuala Lumpur's KLIA cost US$ 2.4 billion and
Bangkok's New International Airports is estimated to cost US$ 2.8.129 Although partly
funded by the private sector, these are very significant investments for those
countries. Consequently, as governments want airlines to use their newly built-
airport, they are not likely to be interested in developing secondary airports e.g. by
allowing commercial aviation at military airports.
On the other hand, examples like Charleroi in Europe have shown that a local
area can experience significant economic stimulation by the incoming tourism that
LCAs bring. As in many Asian countries, economic activity is centered around only a
few major cities, LCAs could stimulate the country's more remote regions that usually
do not have much economic activity.
Airport development is a very time consuming process and most of the newly
built/expanded airports in Asia were planned before the Asian Crisis of 1997/1998
with very optimistic traffic forecasts. These airports will likely be substantially
underutilized for some years to come. Many airport authorities will therefore welcome
any new traffic. Singapore's aviation authority CAAS is willing to waive the landing
fees for all new airlines during the first two years of operation.130 CAAS is also
looking into attracting low-cost airlines by offering "special terms" to LCAs and
considers designating part of its terminals to LCAs.131 Several other airports in Asia
take similar actions.
129 CNN, October 20, 2000
130 Channel News Asia, October 14, 2003
131 The Business Times, September 6, 2003
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4.6.3 Allocation of Traffic Rights
An airline does not usually require traffic rights to fly a specific domestic route
in the country in which it is registered. But as discussed in Chapter 3, it does for most
international routes. Many Asian countries traditionally had - or still have - only one
international carrier, usually a government-owned enterprise. All traffic rights that the
government negotiated with foreign countries were automatically granted to that
airline.
With the potential start-up of international LCAs in Asia, governments will have
to decide how they will allocate the traffic rights that the current airlines use, the
traffic rights that are currently unused/underused as well as traffic rights that will be
negotiated in the future. Singapore's Ministry of Transport stated that it will allocate
traffic rights in a way that "maximizes national interest and public benefit". 3 The
Singapore Airlines Group (Singapore Airlines, SilkAir, SIA Cargo) will keep its
existing rights for 10 years "in recognition of the role that the SIA Group has played in
building Singapore into an aviation hub", according to the Ministry of Transport.
Some of the partly unused rights (e.g. to Thailand and Hong Kong) might be granted
to start-up airlines.
Not all countries in Asia are likely to adopt such a liberal regime. And even in
Singapore's case, it is not really clear what maximizing "national interest and public
benefit" means. In many countries, it might continue to be very difficult to obtain traffic
rights for lucrative routes. AirAsia's subsidiary in Thailand is a joint venture with local
Shin Corporation. The fact that Shin Corporation is controlled by Thailand's Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra might make it easier for AirAsia to be grated traffic rights
in and out of Thailand. Some Thai politicians have already raised concerns about fair
competition.1
132 The Business Times, October 4, 2003
133 The Bangkok Post, November 11, 2003
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4.6.4 Certification
As a rule, new airlines that want to be registered in a country must undergo
some form of certification. The certificate granted is generally referred to as Air
Operator Certificate (AOC). There is usually several classes of AOCs, e.g. for charter
operations, scheduled operations or freight-only operations and the national aviation
authority can impose additional restrictions, e.g. limiting the area of operation to
domestic flights or limiting the size of aircraft. The AOC is primarily intended to
ensure the future airline has the capabilities to ensure the safe operations of its
aircraft. Paragraph 87 of Singapore's Air Navigation Order reads as follows:
"A Singapore aircraft shall not fly on any flight for the purpose of public
transport otherwise than under and in accordance with the terms of an air operator
certificate granted to the operator of the aircraft (...) certifying that the holder of the
certificate is competent to ensure that the aircraft operated by him on such flights are
operated safely."
As this example shows, the terms in an AOC may substantially limit the
airline's ability to operate. This is not limited to Asia but applies in most countries.
However, several airlines in Asia still enjoy preferential treatment from the
government. As aviation authorities have considerable leeway to define the terms of
an AOC, this could mean that the certification process could be misused by a
government to protect the national carrier. A government could limit the operations of
a start-up LCA to domestic flights, thereby limiting the exposure of the flag carrier to
the new competition.
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4.7 Distribution
4.7.1 The Customers
The overwhelming part of the population in North America and Western
Europe can afford to fly, hence are potential customers for LCAs. Since low-income
population segments tend to be more price-sensitive than high-income segments,
LCA customers tend to have lower incomes and customers of traditional airlines.
In many countries in Asia, more than 50% of the population lives on less than
USD 2 a day.134 Even in countries that have undergone substantial economic
development like Thailand, the average income is only about USD 2,000 per year.
Even these relatively high levels of income will not allow people to become regular air
travelers.
Chinese consumer groups estimate the income threshold where people start
to spend money on air travel to be at CNY 20,000 (USD 2,416) per year.135 In 2000,
the average annual income is China was USD 855.136 Although Chinese incomes
grow at over 7% per annum, it will take several decades before a significant part of
the Chinese population is able to fly on a regular basis. But if low-cost airlines
entered the Chinese market, the CNY 20,000 threshold would probably decrease
somewhat as flying would become more affordable. This could substantially stimulate
air travel in China.
As discussed earlier, LCAs will be able to draw away a limited number of
passengers from surfaced-based modes of transportation. But the most important
consumer segment for Asian LCAs will likely be existing air travelers. However, these
individuals are usually part of the upper-class and whether this population segment is
price-sensitive enough to be convinced by a low-cost alternative, is not quite clear
yet. In Asia, people care significantly more about their status. Status-symbols like
luxury watches and high-end automobiles are therefore highly valued in many Asian
cultures. People who can afford traditional airlines might therefore be reluctant to
134 Appendix 2.5
135 South China Moming Post, July 16, 2003
136 World Development Indicators 2002 (World Bank)
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switch to low-cost alternatives because it might imply the message of being overly
cost-conscious which tends to have a negative connotation in most Asian cultures.
4.7.2 Distribution Channels
The internet is by far the most important distribution channel for most low-cost
airlines. Appendix 2.5 shows that internet usage in many countries in Asia is
significantly lower than in most Western countries. Except for Japan and a few other
developed countries in the region, less than 5% of the population has access to the
internet.137 This compares to 50% in the US, 41% in the UK and over 25% in most
other Western European nations.
As discussed in Chapter 2, direct distribution that allows the bypassing of
travel agents and CRS providers, is a key element that distinguishes LCAs from
traditional airlines. Due to the lower internet usage rates in Asia, distribution via the
internet is likely to be more difficult. Although internet usage in Malaysia is among the
highest in Asia, AirAsia's share of online sales is only 45%. This is less than half of
what EasyJet or Ryanair sell over the internet.
Although distribution via the internet is very cost-effective, there are other
alternatives that might be more suitable for Asia. The second most important
distribution channel for many LCAs in North America and Europe is the telephone. In
Asia, most people that can afford to fly, have access to a telephone. Call centers
might therefore likely become the main distribution channel for Asian LCAs.
Mobile phones are increasingly popular in Asia. Most modern mobile phones
allow the user to send and receive short messages via the short message service
(SMS). Malaysian LCA AirAsia was the first airline in the world to introduce an SMS
booking service.138 Mobile phone users can book flights, check airfares and request
schedules via SMS. Although the process is still somewhat inconvenient, it might
become a popular way to book tickets in Asia.
137 Data and definition from UNDP (2002)
138 www.airasia.com
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4.7.3 Credit Card Usage
At LCAs, all bookings usually require instant payment. So although
passengers can usually choose from various distribution channels, credit cards are
usually the only accepted form of payment, regardless of the channel used. But as
credit card usage it limited in many countries in Asia, LCAs might have to offer
alternative methods of instant payment.
Booking a flight on the internet or via a call center and paying the ticket at the
airport at the day of travel would be convenient but is not a viable solution because
payment is not made at the time of booking. Prepaid cards might be a viable
alternative to credit cards. They could be distributed through convenient stores and
be used for payments over the internet as well as over the phone. However, a
significant amount of passengers in Asia will likely prefer to pay cash. AirAsia
therefore opened airport sales offices as well as city offices in most cities it serves.
Although they might be important distribution channels, they are also a major cost
factor. Distribution via travel agents is also a way to combine instant payment with
the possibility to pay cash. AirAsia therefore works together with several "preferred
travel agents". Either the airline will have to provide these agents with some form of
commission, or the agents will charge the passengers some sort of booking fee.
4.8 Summary
The discussions in this Chapter have shown that potential LCAs will face
challenges in Asia different from elsewhere. Some of the key elements of the LCA
business model that were described in Chapter 2 may have to be compromised in
order to adjust to the Asian context. Secondary airports are not an option in many
major Asian cities, leaving only congested and expensive primary airports as a way
to serve these cities. As internet and credit card usage is very limited in most parts of
Asia, LCAs might have to use costly distribution channels like travel agents and city
offices. International air transportation in Asia remains tightly regulated and
government-owned airlines may continue to receive preferential treatments from their
respective governments. Competing against the traditional airlines in Asia is going to
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be challenging since these airlines have several cost advantages over potential Asian
LCAs, most importantly due high aircraft utilization and as a result of flying large
aircraft.
Despite these obstacles and difficulties, examples like AirAsia in Malaysia
show that it is possible to operate a low-cost airline in Asia. Markets are slowly
opening up as governments and other stakeholder realize that it might be in their
interest to create an environment that supports the start-up of LCAs in their country.
However, traditional Asian airlines will not going to give up their intra-Asia business
easily. They will try to retaliate in order to keep their existing business. Chapter 5 will
analyze in more detail what the LCA phenomenon means to these traditional Asian
carriers.
Although the environment for LCAs in Asia is not as favorable as it might be in
North America and Western Europe, the market environment is changing. Disposable
income is rising in almost every Asian country, hence, each year, a larger number of
people in Asia will be able to afford air transportation. Also the regulatory framework
is changing. Important steps have been taken towards liberalizing air transportation in
Asia. Domestically, some countries have deregulated air transportation to a large
extent. The process of liberalizing international air transportation within Asia,
however, remains slow.
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5. Implications and Response Options for Major Stakeholders
5.1 Introduction
The airline industry has a large number of stakeholders. Many of them
carefully follow the evolution of LCAs around the world as some of these groups may
benefit from this trend. Others, including traditional airlines, may observe the success
of LCAs more apprehensively because the same stakeholders in North America and
Europe have struggled to deal with the growing presence of LCAs. This chapter will
look at how four of the most important stakeholder groups are affected by LCAs and
how they could potentially react to this phenomenon.
Traditional airlines are the most directly affected stakeholders and the ones
with the most to lose. Asian carriers have the advantage of being able to refer to the
experiences of traditional airlines in other parts of the world, particularly Europe and
North America, and analyze to how these airlines have responded to the growing
threat that LCAs pose to them. The implications for Asian carriers will be very similar.
Asian carriers can therefore draw upon the possible response options that European
and North American carriers have already experimented with.
Airports are important suppliers to the airline industry and therefore affected by
changes in the airline industry. While traditional airlines generally have a lot to lose,
some airports can potentially benefit from a growing presence of LCAs in Asia.
Countries are also important stakeholders of the airline industry. The general
population of a country are potential users of air transportation. The economy as a
whole has an interest in an efficient and reliable air transport infrastructure. And
some government authorities are particularly important to the airline industry as they
create the regulatory framework in which airlines have to operate.
Other modes of transport are also affected because, to some extent, they
compete for the same customers. Similar to traditional airlines, the impacts from
LCAs on other modes of transport will generally be a negative one. Low-cost airlines
mean additional competition for train, buses and ferry operators. Since these modes
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are among the main forms of intercity transportation in many parts of Asia, the
potential damage that LCAs could cause is substantial.
This chapter will look at traditional airlines, airports, countries and other modes
of transport; analyze how these four stakeholder groups are affected and give an
overview of how they could potentially respond if LCAs were to emerge in Asia on a
large scale.
5.2 Traditional Airlines
5.2.1 Implications
Not surprisingly, the impacts that LCAs have on traditional airlines are largely
negative. Many traditional airlines around the world filed for bankruptcy in recent
years, including once prestigious airlines like Air Canada, Ansett Australia and
Swissair. One of the reasons that led to these and other bankruptcies of airlines was
the increasing competition from low-cost airlines.
Traditional airlines are losing customers to LCAs because of the significant
difference in fares. Since traditional airlines would like to prevent to loss of
customers, they are forced to lower their fares. As a result, many major airlines in
North America and Europe experienced declining yields over the last decade.139
Since many traditional airlines were also faced with increasing costs at the same
time, the profitability of the traditionally low-margined airline industry suffered
substantially.
Low-cost airlines tend to be very innovative. JetBlue was the first airline to
offer free live satellite TV in every seat.140 AirAsia was the first airline to allow
customers to book flights using the short messaging system (SMS) of mobile
phones.141 Traditional airlines are used to competing on various dimensions, such as
139 Airline annual reports, IATA statistical reports
140 www.jetblue.com
141 www.airasia.com
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price or frequency. With the start-up of LCAs, there now seams to be a trend towards
competing on innovation.
Until recently, Singapore Airlines and its subsidiaries were granted all the
traffic rights that the government of Singapore negotiated with other nations. This has
been practiced in many Asian countries because they only had one international
carrier that could use these rights. With the possibility of international LCAs starting-
up in Asia, this is likely going to change. How traffic rights will be allocated to the
various competing carriers has not been decided yet. But traditional Asian carriers
might no longer be the sole recipients of these traffic rights. They might have to start
competing for them.
5.2.2 Response Options
5.2.2.1 Add New Low-Cost Operation
Many traditional airlines decided to start their own low-cost operation in a
move to better compete with LCAs. Such efforts have been described in Chapter 2.
The experience with this strategy in other parts of the world has been mixed. In the
early days of LCAs in the United States, several traditional airlines started their own
low-cost operations. None of these early-days low-cost operations still exists today as
their business plans might not have been sustainable. Many of these low-cost
operations had the same cost structure as the mainline operation; hence the lower
fares might not have been able to cover costs. The approach of traditional airlines
has changed since then. Most of the low-cost operations of traditional airlines today
do have a viable business plan and are meant to be more or less autonomous profit
centers.
The degree of independence that the low-cost operation is given from the
mainline operation is a crucial question when this strategy is chosen. The low-cost
operation could be part of the existing operation, be a separate business unit or even
be a separate legal entity. The more independent the low-cost operation is, the
greater the flexibility and the lower usually the cost structure because the entity is
able to build its own cost structure as opposed to having to operate at the same costs
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as the mainline operation. The low-cost operation is able to generate substantial cost
savings if it can negotiate separate labor contracts, choose its own distribution
channels and is able to develop an independent network and timetable. However,
with a high degree of independence, the low-cost operation is likely to start
cannibalizing the mainline operation. Many low-cost operations of traditional airlines
(e.g. United's Ted, SAS's Snowflake) have been set-up at one of the hubs of the
owning airline. Since, these low-cost operations tend to be point-to-point carriers,
they directly compete on markets to and from this hub. Since a network airline has a
very dominant position at its hubs, these markets tend to be some of the more
lucrative ones. To some extent, the LCA operation will start cannibalizing the
mainline operation in these markets. This cannibalization effect was one of the main
reasons why British Airways sold its low-cost operation GO.142
Despite the fact that the results of such a strategy has been very mixed in
other parts of the world, several traditional Asian airlines plan to follow such a
strategy of adding a low-cost operation. In 2003, both Thai Airways and Singapore
Airlines announced that they have plans to start their own low-cost operations.
5.2.2.2 Change Existing Product
Several airlines in North America and Europe changed their existing economy
class product in a way to make it more similar to the product of LCAs. In 2003, Swiss
International Air Lines changed its economy class product on all its European flights.
EasyJet's strong presence in Geneva, the increasing number of foreign LCAs that
serve Zurich and the recent start-up of local LCA Helvetic all prompted the national
carrier to rethink its short-haul economy class product. 143 Swiss lowered its economy
class fares significantly, most of the fares now need to be booked online and the
airline no longer offers complimentary inflight meals. All these and other changes
were aimed at making the airline's economy class product more similar to the offering
of an LCA.
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142 No Frills, Simon Calder, 2002
143 www.helvetic.com
According to the airline, the move has been successful. In November 2003,
Swiss International Air Lines reported the following changes as compared to the time
before the product modification.4 4
Relative Change
Yield -11%
Load Factor +16%
Revenue per ASK +3.2%
Table 5.1: Relative changes following the modifications
made to Swiss' economy class product
These figures suggest that the demand is price-elastic. The average fare
decreased by 11%, which resulted in an increase in demand of 16%. Overall, the
airline generates 3.2% more revenue than it did before. On the cost side, the airline
will experience savings in the area of passenger service (e.g. catering) and an
incremental increase in fuel costs. Total costs are likely going to be lower. Since
revenue increased 3.2%, the airline's profitability improved.
Will something like this be viable in Asia? Airlines would experience the
challenges of operating a low-cost airline in Asia, which have been discussed in
Chapter 4 (long stage lengths, few secondary airports etc.). Furthermore, most of
Asia's leading network carriers (e.g. Singapore Airlines, Cathay Pacific, Japan
Airlines) have positioned themselves has premium airlines in terms of passenger
service. Hence, they will not likely turn parts of their existing products into some form
of low-cost offering. And also most of Asia's second tier airlines aim to become
premium airlines. Thai Airways' current corporate strategy is entitled Towards Asian
Leadership.14 5 The airline plans to improve passenger services and is therefore not
likely going to cut them instead.
If an airline chooses to convert its short-haul economy class product into a
low-cost offering, it must take network effects into account. In the case of Swiss, the
144 Press Release, November 27, 2003 (www.swiss.com)
145 www.thaiair.com
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airline's European network is part of its global network. Depending on the airline's
revenue management system, it might be that the additional low-yield demand that is
stimulated on European flights displaces connecting traffic to airline's long haul
flights. An important role of short-haul flights in the network of a network carrier is to
feed passengers to and from long-haul flights. If these connecting passengers do not
obtain seats on the short-haul feeder flights they will also be absent on the airline's
long-haul flights. Hence, some long-haul flights might no longer be sustained and the
long-haul network might shrink.
5.2.2.3 Reduce Costs
A traditional airline might choose not to change its existing product or add a
new product but instead to more efficiently produce and distribute its products. Most
North American and European airlines have therefore introduced online booking
engines, electronic tickets and check-in kiosks. Many of them cut travel agent
commissions and also introduced other measures targeted at reducing costs.
The airline industry is a very capital-intensive business. The ability to use
assets very efficiently is very important in order to be able to finance them. An
airline's fleet - if not leased - ties down large amounts of capital. These capital costs
do generally not depend on how much the fleet is being used. Hence, there are
substantial cost savings to be gained if the fleet utilization can be improved.
Traditional Asian airlines might therefore find ways to maximize their aircraft
utilization, e.g. by using modern fleet assignment methods, minimizing turnaround
times or offering off-peak flights.
Another step in making the most efficient use of an airline's fleet is to ensure
that each flight generates the highest possible revenue. A modern revenue
management system is able to fill an airline's daily capacity with those passengers
that generate the highest revenue. By replacing a simple revenue management
system by a more sophisticated system that takes into account network effects,
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traditional airlines can often increase their revenues by 6-8% at relatively low
additional costs.146
5.2.2.4 Aggressive Pricing Response
Delta Air Lines has a major hub in Atlanta; hence the airline has a very
dominant position in markets to and from that city. In May 2003, JetBlue launched
flights from Atlanta to Long Beach, a secondary airport close to Los Angeles in
California. Delta's immediate response was to "slash fares and hike capacity from
Atlanta to all of its destinations in and around Los Angeles by nearly 50%".147 Despite
being funded very comfortably, JetBlue decided to move out of Atlanta after several
month of fierce competition with Delta.
Since traditional airlines tend to have stronger financial resources and are
generating revenues in many different markets, they are able to sustain a price war in
one specific market without significant impacts on the company's overall financial
performance. LCAs depend much more on the profitability of each market and they
usually do not have the financial resources to sustain price wars over several
months.
Although appealing, a traditional airline cannot start price wars in all markets
that are under attack. Making a market unattractive for an LCA by cutting fares and
increasing capacity is only a viable strategy if the LCA can turn to more attractive
markets. If all traditional airlines would start price wars in all cities that are under
attack by LCAs, LCAs would have no other cities to turn to. If price wars are used
only in a few selected cities, LCAs might be kept away from very lucrative markets by
allowing them enter less important ones. However, it will only be a matter of time
before LCAs will want to enter these lucrative markets, too. JetBlue might decide to
go back to Atlanta a few years from now. Responding to the threat of LCAs by price
wars is therefore only a short to medium-term strategy. Price wars have no impact on
the competitiveness of traditional airlines.
146 PROS Revenue Management (www.prosrm.com)
147 Business Week, November 24, 2003
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In addition to that, Delta's price and capacity conduct might potentially be
considered predatory by its competitors or government authorities, which might not
be legal under the laws of the United States. An airline that chooses to start a price
war with an LCA therefore takes the risks of being sued over predatory price and
capacity conduct.
5.2.2.5 Repositioning
Traditional airlines could also reposition themselves in a way that makes them
less exposed to competition from LCAs. There are various strategies to achieve this.
As of today, no low-cost airline offers long-haul flights of more than 8 hours.
The reasons for this were explained in Chapter 2. Airlines like Virgin Atlantic offer
long-haul flights only. These airlines do not directly compete with LCAs and are
therefore not affected by the increasing presence of LCAs. Traditional airlines might
therefore choose to focus their growth strategy on their long-haul network.
Another strategy is to exploit the advantages of a hub. By consolidating
demand at a hub it is possible to produce flight itineraries more efficiently. Joint
Production in the airline industry means that parts of individual itineraries can be
produced jointly. Delta's flight DL 219 from Boston to Atlanta produces part of the
Boston - Atlanta - Miami itinerary as well as part of the Boston - Atlanta - Denver
itinerary. Since LCAs tend to be point-to-point carriers, they are not able to do this.
Whereas LCAs need to serve markets with substantial local OD traffic, network
airlines can serve cities with relatively little local OD demand by consolidating
demand from that city to multiple destinations at their hubs. In many cases, regional
jets might be appropriate for such operations.
Another strategy is to focus on yield as opposed to passenger numbers. If a
traditional airline loses passengers to LCAs, it might try to defend its yields rather
than keeping passenger by lowering fares. British Airways has chosen this strategy in
recent years. The airline tried to reduce the share of connecting traffic and tried to
focus on the generally more lucrative local OD traffic. British Airways also improved
its Business and First Class product. In additional to that, a forth service class, World
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Traveller Plus, was introduced on long-haul flights. All these measures were targeted
to increase total revenue, both by attracting more customers and increasing the
revenue collected from each existing customer.
Another option might be to strengthen the airline's cargo division. Many of the
most profitable airline companies in the world (e.g. Singapore Airlines, Emirates) earn
a substantial part of their group-level revenues from their cargo division. Such a
strategy might be particularly attractive for Asian airlines as cargo traffic in and out of
Asia is forecasted to grow substantially in the coming years.148 Increased cargo
revenues could offset some of the lost passenger revenues.
5.3 Airports
5.3.1 Implications
Airports generate aeronautical revenues and non-aeronautical revenues.
Aeronautical revenues includes landing fees, aircraft parking fees as well as
passenger service charges and is collected from the airlines or directly from the
passengers. Non-aeronautical revenues include rental income from shops, airline
and other outlets, car parking revenues as well as payments from other
concessionaires on the airport premises.
LCAs tend to be more cost-conscious than traditional airlines. However, the
scope with which airlines can influence the costs they incur at any given airport is
limited. Therefore, LCAs have to pay the same landing charges as traditional airlines.
The experience in other parts of the world has shown that low-cost airlines tend to
favor gates that are less convenient for passengers but cheaper for the airline. Asian
airport operators may therefore experience an increased demand for such gates.
Also, many Asian LCAs will likely start as domestic carriers. Since at many Asian
airports, domestic flights depart from a different terminal than international flights, the
additional demand for gates will probably be highest at the domestic terminal.
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148 Airbus Global Market Forecast
Many Asian airports (e.g. Bangkok) charge an airport tax for departing
passengers but not for connecting passengers. Since most LCAs carry relatively little
connecting passengers, airports authorities will be able to charge this tax from
virtually all LCA passengers.
Asian airport operators will also feel an impact on non-aeronautical revenues.
LCAs usually do not offer any airport lounges or other large passenger facilities at
airports. Operating airport sales offices is also very uncommon for LCAs. Therefore,
rental income from LCAs will be relatively low compared to traditional airlines.
As explained in Chapter 4, LCAs use significantly smaller aircraft than
traditional airlines. If LCAs succeed in competing for traffic of traditional airlines, the
number of aircraft movements will increase significantly. Additionally, the lower fares
will also stimulate additional traffic. This will increase the number of aircraft
movements even more. This could lead to congestion problems at certain major
Asian airports.
5.3.2 Response Options
Since LCAs are very cost-conscious and generally not interested in added
services, airport operators might turn to passengers in order to grow their revenues.
Particularly food and beverage outlets might turn out to be a profitable strategy since
LCAs generally do not offer free meals on board. LCAs in Europe and North America
serve many airports that are somewhat farther away from any major city. A
substantial share of passengers arrives at the airport by private car. Extensive car
parking facilities might therefore be another revenue-generating option for airports
that are served by LCAs.
Passenger numbers are likely going to grow if a LCA starts servicing an
airport, particularly if the airline decides to make the airport one of its focus cities. On
the one hand, the rising traffic numbers could lead to increased congestion at major
Asian airports. These airports might therefore decide to discourage the use of smaller
aircraft with the establishment of appropriate policies and fees. On the other hand,
increasing passenger numbers might be favorable for underutilized regional airports.
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They could attract LCAs by offering attractive conditions for the use of their facilities.
Several European airports have done this. The legality of such strategies is currently
examined by the EU. In Asia, this is not likely going to happen as the legal systems
tend to be less elaborate in the area of the legality of government subsidies.
In the long run, airports might include the needs of LCAs in their expansion
plans. If LCAs will become a common sight at Asian airports, the average aircraft size
in Asia will decrease to some extent. While most Asian airports were built to
accommodate wide-body aircraft, these airports might decide to build smaller gates
and parking positions to more efficiently accommodate the increasing number of
narrow-body aircraft. Also, if passenger numbers increase and additional runways
are needed, Asian airports no longer need to build long runways that were needed to
accommodate wide-body aircraft. The increasing fleet of narrow-body aircraft in Asia
might justify building shorter runways to supplement existing capacity.
5.4 Countries
5.4.1 Implications
Chapter 4 explained that many Asian countries would benefit from a more
liberal aviation industry because the lower cost of air travel would positively affect
social welfare. Not only users of air transportation would benefit, also related
industries such as the hospitality industry would likely experience positive impacts.
However, if a country creates legal and economic frameworks that encourage
the start-up of LCAs and other private airlines, the country's flag carrier is likely going
to suffer. Since LCAs will provide many short-haul services that existing airlines do,
countries do not have to fear to lose any important internal air services because of
that. However, if the profitability of short-haul routes begins to suffer, traditional
airlines might no longer be willing to cross-subsidize unprofitable domestic routes that
they have been asked to serve by the government as part of a national air transport
infrastructure. If governments allow LCAs to start-up, they may need to allow the
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national carrier to give up these unprofitable routes in order to ensure that the flag
carrier is able to effectively compete with LCAs.
Many Asian countries used to have one single airline, often a state-owned
enterprise. The traffic rights that the government negotiated with other countries were
all granted to this airline. As Asian LCAs might decide to fly international routes, the
allocation of traffic rights will become more difficult. Obtaining traffic rights
fundamentally affects the business opportunities of any international airline. How
these rights are distributed among competing airlines is therefore a crucial question.
Governments must decide how to handle this potentially controversial problem.
5.4.2 Response Options
The citizens of counties that are served by low-cost airlines today tend to think
positively of the introduction of LCAs. Many Asian countries might therefore follow the
examples of countries in Europe and North America and try to create an aviation
environment that supports the start-up of domestic LCAs. For several Asian countries
this will require substantial deregulation efforts.
As explained, Asian governments might also need to start allocating
international traffic rights among the various competitors. A reasonable approach
would be to choose an allocation scheme that benefits the country as a whole. The
transport ministry of Singapore said it would allocate traffic rights in a way that
"maximizes national interest and social benefit". 49 This strategy is theoretically sound
but practically, it is not clear what a social-benefit-maximizing traffic right allocation
should look like.
Many Asian countries continue to provide preferential treatment to their flag
carriers. As long as that carrier is the only carrier in the country, governments could
ague that treating the national carrier better than foreign carriers is in the national
interest and choose to do this even though it might not be in accordance with WTO
regulations. However, if there is more than one carrier in that country, preferential
149 The Business Times, October 4, 2003
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treatment of one carrier could result in unfair competition; hence treating the flag
carrier better might no longer be in the national interest.
Most governments want all regions of the national territory to have access to
the country's transportation infrastructure. As countries get richer, the air
transportation network becomes an integral part of the country's transportation
infrastructure. However, it might not always make commercial sense to serve all
regions of a country by air. Several Asian governments therefore force their flag
carriers to serve these unprofitable routes. In return, the flag carrier enjoys some
form of preferential treatment. But with the potential of the start-up of domestic LCAs,
Asian governments may have to rethink these arrangements as such interventions
could result in unfair competition.
5.5 Competing Modes of Transport
5.5.1 Implications
The implication of growing LCAs on competing modes of transport is one of
increased competition. Traditionally, air transport is one of the most convenient and
most expensive modes of transport. LCAs will therefore take away the customers
from other modes of transport.
It will be the convenient-conscious train, bus and ferry passengers with a
relatively low price-elasticity that are most likely to switch to air transportation. Due to
this low price elasticity of the customers that have been lost, it makes little sense for
operators of other modes of transport to lower their fares. It is unlikely that they can
win back these customers by lowering fares as this would not significantly influence
their decision which mode to choose. The increased competition from LCAs will
therefore not directly put pressure on the fares of other modes of transport.
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5.5.2 Response Options
Rail and bus operators must have an incentive to keep these lucrative
customers. Because of the low-price elasticity of the customers concerned, the
response strategy would be one of increasing the level of service as opposed to
lowering fares. Rail and bus have several advantages over air transport. Apart from
being less costly, they can provide downtown-to-downtown services. The total trip
time for short journeys by air can be substantially longer than just the flying time
because airports are located some distance from the city center and because of the
time spent at the origin and destination airports. Surface-based modes of transport
might therefore decide to build on these competitive advantages. If operators decide
to start lowering fares, the level-of-service, which in several Asian countries is
already relatively low, will decrease even further, possibly making even more
customers switch to LCAs.
5.6 Summary
In North America and Europe, low-cost airlines have transformed the airline
industry significantly over the past two decades. Many stakeholders of the Asian
airline industry therefore anxiously follow the development of the first low-cost airlines
in Asia. For some groups, there might be a lot to gain, others might have a lot to lose.
By looking at what as happened in other parts of the world, traditional Asian
airlines rightly worry about start-up LCAs in the region. However, traditional carriers
in Asia have the advantage of being able to learn from other traditional airlines
around the world, that have been competing with LCAs for quite some time now.
There is a range of response options that might help to make traditional airlines more
competitive against LCAs. Several big Asian carriers have already made their first
steps in that direction.
Also Asia's airports will feel an impact should LCAs succeed in Asia. The
experience in North America and Europe has shown that doing business with LCAs
can be very attractive for some airports. But there will also be challenges for Asian
airports, particularly for major ones. If LCAs can strengthen their presence in Asia,
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aircraft movements might grow significantly, which could lead to severe congestion
problems at some airports.
Since the general population is likely to benefit from a more competitive
market for air transportation, government authorities are likely to encourage the start-
up of LCAs. But first, many countries will have to substantially liberalize their
domestic aviation market before LCAs might start up. And for international air
transport, the way in which governments allocate traffic rights is going to be of
fundamental importance.
Surface-based modes of transportation make up the backbone of the national
transportation infrastructure in most Asian countries. But as with LCAs, the cost of air
travel will decrease substantially, there might be a shift from surface-based modes of
transportation to LCAs. Particularly train, bus and ferry operators could therefore lose
some of their most lucrative customers.
If LCAs in Asia will succeed, the Asian airline industry will undoubtedly
undergo substantial changes. The impacts will be felt by traditional Asian carriers and
far beyond. For some stakeholders, it will be very difficult to respond to this
challenge. In Europe and North America, several have failed to survive.
115
116
6. Summary
Low-cost airlines have been very successful in North America and Europe.
They are among the fastest growing and most profitable airlines in these regions. The
LCA business model has a proven record of success on both sides of the Atlantic
and has influenced traditional airlines, air transport users, airport operators and many
other stakeholders alike. The question seems therefore justified: Is there a potential
for low-cost airlines in Asia?
LCAs are essentially in the same business as traditional airlines: operating a
fleet of aircraft and selling the produced capacity to potential users. Both traditional
and low-cost carriers offer the same core service, air transport from A to B. Although
traditional airlines and LCAs are essentially in the same business and offer the same
core service, they significantly differ in how this service is produced and distributed.
Some of the key elements that low-cost airlines use include operating flight with short
stage lengths, use of uncongested secondary airports, homogeneous fleet, short
turnaround times and carrying relatively few connecting passengers. All these and
other key elements that are frequently found among LCAs have one common goal:
high utilization of assets.
Distribution is another area where LCAs choose a different approach.
Established airlines have traditionally distributed their services through travel agents
and computer reservation systems. To a great extent, LCAs sell their services directly
to their customers and are therefore able to bypass these intermediaries; hence they
do not incur the applicable costs.
With these and other strategies, LCAs are able to generate substantial cost
savings, which allow them to offer relatively low airfares. LCAs can therefore
stimulate new demand that traditional airlines have traditionally decided not to satisfy.
Hence, LCAs do not simply draw away passengers from traditional airlines, they
attract passengers from other modes of transport and also stimulate completely new
travel demand.
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Southwest is generally regarded as being the first low-cost airline in the history
of aviation. The airline made its maiden flight on June 18, 1971. The domestic US
airline industry has seen many more low-cost entrants since then. Today, US LCAs
account for more than 20% of capacity in the domestic US market.1 50 In the late
nineties, LCAs began to emerge in Europe, equally successful. Why shouldn't Asia
experience the same phenomenon? Homogenous fleet, distribution via the internet
and short turnaround times must also be possible in Asia. Hence, at first sight, one
could conclude that the LCA business model should also be viable in Asia. However,
as this thesis analyzed in Chapter 3, the airline industry in Asia is different from the
rest of the world in several respects.
Many markets in Asia remain highly regulated, which poses a substantial
obstacle to prospective LCAs. Until recently, the Government of Thailand set
minimum domestic airfares to US 9.8 per kilometer.1 51 Although slowly
disappearing, such profound government interventions create a very difficult
environment for LCAs to operate.
Many traditional Asian carriers are state-owned, often with close links to the
government and its regulating authorities. In many cases, traffic rights for lucrative
international routes might be very difficult to obtain. Due to the absence of a powerful
regional entity, such as the EU in Europe, the Asian airline industry is not likely going
to see substantial multilateral liberalization efforts.
Another potential stumbling block for Asian LCAs is the fact that traditional
Asian carriers have among the world's lowest unit costs. This is mainly due to lower
input costs, the large fleet of wide-body aircraft as well as the relatively long stage-
lengths that characterize these airlines. As a result, Singapore Airlines' unit costs are
59% lower than the unit costs of American Airlines. 15 2 Asian LCAs will also enjoy the
lower input costs in Asia, however, not all cost advantages that make Singapore
Airlines' unit cost so low will be applicable to an Asian LCA. For instance, if an LCA
starts flying from Singapore to Bangkok, its 150 narrow-body aircraft will have to
compete with 390-seat wide-body aircraft from Singapore Airlines that has much
150 Business Week, November 24, 2003
151 The Nation, November 21, 2003
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lower unit costs. It is therefore not clear yet whether the LCA business model will be
able to reduce costs low enough to be able to compete with established Asian
airlines.
Another challenge Asian LCAs have to confront is that in many parts of Asia,
the aviation infrastructure is far less developed than in North America or Europe. For
instance, suitable secondary airports are not as widely available as in other parts of
the world. Many important Asian cities have only one primary airport, often congested
at peak-times. Slots for departures and arrivals at convenient times for passengers
might therefore be hard to obtain in some cases.
Low-cost airlines generate a significant part of their cost savings in the area of
distribution. The internet and credit cards are usually two core elements in any
distribution strategy of an LCA. However, in many parts of Asia, internet and credit
card usage remains relatively low, which might potentially hinder a lean and cost-
efficient way of distributing services. Some existing Asian LCAs therefore work
together with selected travel agents or operate city sales offices.153 Although
convenient for the customer, these are very expensive distribution channels
compared to online distribution.
Despite these and other challenges, Asia might still attract start-up LCAs. The
economic development in many Asian countries has been very substantial in recent
years with disposable incomes rising in most Asian countries. As people become
wealthier, they spend an increasing percentage of their disposable income on leisure-
related activities such as traveling. As Asian nations become wealthier and more
industrialized, the population will also enjoy more free time. IATA, Airbus and many
other organizations therefore forecast the demand for air travel in Asia to grow
substantially in the coming years. Many forecasts predict Asia to grow significantly
faster than most other regions in the world. Airbus even predicts Asia to become the
world's largest market for air transportation by 2020.154 The fact that LCAs are going
to charge significantly lower fares than traditional Asian carriers will stimulate
152 Appendix 2.7
154 e.g. AirAsia (www.airasia.com)
1 Airbus Global Market Forecast (2002)
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additional demand for air transportation in Asia and might therefore support such
optimistic growth predictions.
Another promising development is that several countries in Asia have made
the first steps towards a more liberalized aviation environment. Although it is going to
be a slow process, Asian LCAs will likely benefit from such changes in the regulatory
framework.
The airline industry is a highly interconnected industry. On the one hand,
various stakeholders will affect the potential success of LCAs in Asia. Low-cost
airlines in Asia will particularly depend on Asian governments to liberalize domestic
and international markets for air transportation. On the other hand, many
stakeholders will be affected by LCAs. Especially traditional Asian airlines will feel the
impact of increased competition from low-cost airlines. The growing presence of
LCAs in Europe and North America was one of the reasons why traditional airlines
like Air Canada, United Airlines or Swissair filed for bankruptcy. Established Asian
carriers therefore follow the development of Asian LCAs very carefully. Operators of
other modes of transport might also feel the additional competition from LCAs. As a
result, Asia's users of transportation will likely benefit from the increased competition
and lower cost of air travel.
During the time this thesis has been written, the discussion about LCAs in Asia
has become increasingly popular and the Asian airline industry has seen a growing
number of start-up LCAs. Several independent LCAs have been launched and many
more have been announced. Malaysia's AirAsia, one of the very first Asian LCAs,
continues to gain ground domestically and has started to expanded internationally so
that traditional airlines in Southeast Asia feel the need to take action. Singapore
Airlines has teamed up with the founders of Ryanair and is expected to formally
launch its low-cost subsidiary Tiger Airways in the second half of 2004. Mr. Chew
Choon Seng, CEO of Singapore Airlines, recently said: "SIA recognizes the potential
for low-cost travel in this part of the world and wishes to participate in this new
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segment of the market." 155 These and other recent developments might indicate that
low-cost airlines will indeed be a part of the future Asian airline industry.
This thesis was an attempt to assess the potential for low-cost airlines in Asia.
As mentioned, the Asian airline industry will undergo substantial changes in many
respects. Particularly the fact that there seems to be a development towards a more
liberal aviation environment in some parts of Asia will have substantial impacts on
many stakeholders. The LCA phenomenon will only be one aspect of this evolution.
Areas of Further Research
This thesis has tried to assess the potential for low-cost airlines in Asia. The
area that has been researched is highly dynamic and continues to evolve. There are
several aspects that may ask for further investigation.
The focus of this thesis has been Asia, motivated by the growing importance of
Asia as a market for air transportation. However, several low-cost airlines have
recently started up in other parts of the world, including Africa and South America. As
much as Asia differs from the rest of the world, so will other regions have their own
distinct characterizes that will affect the potential for low-cost airline there. Future
research might therefore investigate the LCA phenomenon in other parts of the world
or detached from any regional focus.
Even in some of the more mature markets for air transportation like the
domestic United States, where LCAs have been in business for quite some time now,
LCAs continue to draw away passengers from established airlines as well as other
modes of transport. In case this trend is bound to reach an equilibrium, it has not
been reached yet because the growth rate of LCAs continues to be significantly
higher than the one of established airlines. Whether an equilibrium will be reached
and how it might look like could also be part of further research.
The business model of low-cost airlines has been analyzed in Chapter 2 of this
thesis. Some of the key elements that make LCAs so competitive in the marketplace
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155 www.tigerairways.com
may be transferred to other modes of transportation or even to other industries. Lean
production of goods and services or cost-efficient distribution, two key elements in
the low-cost airline business, are also responsible for the success behind companies
like Dell or Amazon. Research into what other modes of transport and other
industries might learn from LCAs could turn out to be a very rewarding areas of
investigation.
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Appendix 1.1
Low-Cost Airlines: Product information
use of secondary airports
hubs / focus cities
connecting passengers
available at travel agents
share of direct online sales
paper tickets
seat density (pitch)
cargo services
partnerships with airlines
frequent flyer program
share of international flights
sources: airline websites, airline annual reports, Skytrax (airlinequality.com), Air Transport
(usatoday.com), Air Transport Intelligence (rati.com), Hoover's (hoovers.com)
World (atwonline.com), CAA (caa.co.uk), USA Today
AirAsia plans to develop Senai Airport into a second hub.
2 With REX (Regional Express)
3 Virgin Blue has recently applied for traffic rights to New Zealand and other international destinations in the South Pacific.
Southwest
high
multiple
significant
yes
50%
no
32-33 inch
yes
no
yes
none
JetBlue
mixed
multiple
insignificant
yes
63%
no
32-34 inch
yes
no
yes
none
EasyJet
mixed
multiple
insignificant
no
91%
no
29 inch
no
no
no
high
Ryanair
very high
multiple
insignificant
no
94%
no
30 inch
no
no
no
high
VirginBlue
low
multiple
significant
yes
no data
no
32 inch
yes
yes2
no
none
AirAsia
low
one'
insignificant
yes
45%
no
29 inch
no
no
no
low
Appendix 1.2
Low-Cost Airlines: Financial
load factor
RPK ('000)
yield (US cents per RPK)
unit cost (US cents per ASK)
aircraft utilization (h/day)
operating margin
average fare (USD)
number of employees
number of aircraft types
number of aircraft
int'l / total destinations
annual passengers (mill)
avg passenger haul (km)
aircraft/destinations ratio
ASK per employee
and Operational Information
Southwest
65.9%
73,035,572
7.32
4.61
11.2
7.6%
85
33,705
1
383
0 /58
63.0
1,159
6.6
3,288
JetBlue
83.0%
10,998,847
5.59
4.00
12.9
16.5%
107
3,823
1 4
47
0/22
5.8
1,896
2.1
3,466
sources: airline websites, airline annual reports, Skytrax (airlinequality.com), Air Transport World (atwonline.com), CAA
(usatoday.com), Air Transport Intelligence (rati.com), Hoover's (hoovers.com)
4 JetBlue plans to add 100 Embraer 190 aircraft to its fleet starting 2005.
5 EasyJet is currently in transition from a B737 fleet to an A319/A320 fleet.
6 Only 3 of EasyJet's 76 international destinations are outside the EU.
7 Only 2 of Ryanair's 76 international destinations are outside the EU.
(caa.co.uk), USA Today
(0
C\J
EasyJet
84.8%
9,218,000
9.71
7.26
11.1
12.4%
92
3,100
2 5
70
766 /84
11.4
809
0.8
3,506
Ryanair
84.0%
10,200,000
8.37
5.56
no data
31.3%
54
1,897
1
59
76 7 /80
15.7
650
0.7
6,4018
VirginBlue
79.4%
3,924,000
4.92
3.43
no data
16.7%
89
1,421
1
35
0/17
2.3
1,706
2.1
2,897
AirAsia
70%
no data
2.54
1.64
no data
9.4%
no data
812
1
7
0/13
no data
no data
0.5
no data
Appendix 1.3
Established Airlines: Product Information
use of secondary airports
hubs / focus cities
connecting passengers
available at travel agents
share of direct online sales
paper tickets
seat density (pitch)
cargo services
partnerships with airlines
frequent flyer program
share of international flights
low-cost airline subsidiary
American
no
multiple
significant
yes
no data
yes 0
33-35 inch
minor
yes (oneWorld)
yes
low
evaluating
Continental
no
multiple
significant
yes
no data
yes 1
31-33 inch
minor
yes
yes
low
abandoned
Lufthansa
no
two
significant
yes
no data
yes
31 inch
major
yes (Star)
yes
high
indirect stake"
British Airways
no
two9
significant
yes
no data
yes
31 inch
major
yes (oneWorld)
yes
high
sold
Qantas
no
multiple
significant
yes
no data
yes
31 inch
major
yes (oneWorld)
yes
medium
evaluating
sources: airline websites, airline annual reports, Skytrax (airlinequality.com), Air Transport World (atwonline.com), CAA (caa.co.uk), USA Today
(usatoday.com), Air Transport Intelligence (rati.com), Hoover's (hoovers.com)
9 London-Heathrow and London-Gatwick could together be considered a single multi-airport hub.
For itineraries which allow e-ticketing, AA and CO charge an additional fee to passengers wishing a paper ticket.
" Germanwings is an LCA fully owned by Eurowings. Lufthansa has a minority stake in Eurowings.
SIA
no
one
significant
yes
no data
yes
32 inch
major
yes (Star)
yes
100%
evaluating
Appendix 1.4
Established Airlines: Financial and Operational Information
load factor
RPK ('000)
yield (US cents per RPK)
unit cost (US cents per ASK)
aircraft utilization (h/day)
operating margin
average fare (USD)
number of employees
number of aircraft types
number of aircraft
int'l / total destinations
annual passengers (mill)
avg passenger haul (km)
aircraft/destinations ratio
ASK per employee
American
70.7%
195,897,000
7.37
6.92
10.1
-15.2%
168
93,500
8
771
63/204
94.1
2,082
3.8
2,963
Continental
74.2%
92,191,000
7.23
5.73
10.8
-0.1%
197
48,000
5
347
59/223
40.0
2,304
1.6
2,588
Lufthansa
73.9%
88,600,000
13.78
9.50
9.2
4.6%
267
29,494
8
215
144/157
43.9
2,018
1.4
4,065
British Airways
71.9%
100,112,000
10.67
8.61
9.4
3.8%
296
57,014
6
241
204/215
38.0
2,635
1.1
2,442
Qantas
78.3%
75,134,000
8.21
6.20
11.6
6.0%
219
33,044
5
135
21/38
27.1
2,772
3.6
2,904
SIA
74.5%
74,183,000
5.26
3.88
11.0
6.8%
252
14,418
3
79
54/55
15.3
4,849
1.4
6,906
sources: airline websites, airline annual reports, Skytrax (airlinequality.com), Air Transport World (atwonline.com), CAA (caa.co.uk),
(usatoday.com), Air Transport Intelligence (rati.com), Hoover's (hoovers.com)
USA Today
00J
Appendix 2.1
Airline Associations
Air Transport Association of
America
Alaska Airlines
Aloha Airlines
America West Airlines
American Airlines
American Trans Air
Atlas Air
Continental Airlines
Delta Air Lines
Hawaiian Airlines
JetBlue Airways
Midwest Express Airlines
Northwest Airlines
Southwest Airlines
United Airlines
US Airways
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Only includes passenger airlines. Does not include associate members. Not all airlines may participate
in all reports used in this thesis. Memberships as of October 1, 2003.
Association of European
Airlines
Adria Airways
Aer Lingus
Air France
Air Malta
Alitalia
Austrian
BMI
British Airways
Croatia Airlines
CSA Czech Airlines
Cyprus Airways
Finnair
Iberia
Icelandair
JAT Jugoslav Airlines
KLM
LOT Polish Airlines
Lufthansa
Luxair
Malev
Meridiana
Olympic Airways
SAS Scandinavian Airlines
SN Brussels Airlines
Spanair
Swiss International Air Lines
TAP Air Portugal
TAROM
Turkish Airlines
Virgin Atlantic
Association of Asia Pacific
Airlines
Air New Zealand
All Nippon Airways
Asiana Airlines
Cathay Pacific Airways
China Airlines
Dragonair
EVA Air
Garuda Indonesia
Japan Airlines
Korean Air
Malaysia Airlines
Philippine Airlines
Qantas Airways
Royal Brunei Airlines
Singapore Airlines
Thai Airways International
Vietnam Airlines
Appendix 2.2
Ownership of AAPA Member Airlines
Flag Carriers
China Airlines
Malaysia Airlines
Royal Brunei Airlines
Singapore Airlines
Thai Airways
Vietnam Airlines
Country
Taiwan
Malaysia
Brunei Darussalam
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Private Carriers Country Important Shareholders
All Nippon Airways Japan none
Asiana Airlines South Korea Kumho Industrial Co. (29.8%)
Kumho Petrochemical Co. (15.1%)
Cathay Pacitic Hong Kong SAR Swire Group (45.1%)
Citic Pacific (25.4%)
Dragonair Hong Kong SAR China National Aviation Co. (43.3%)
Citic Pacific (29.4%)
Cathay Pacific (17.8%)
EVA Air Taiwan Evergreeen Marine Corp. (13.5%)
Evergreen International Corp. (25.3%)
JAL Japan none
Korean Air South Korea Mr. Yang-Ho Cho & Family (30.8%)
Philippine Airlines Philippines Lucio Tan (53.8%)
source: Reed Business Information (www.rati.com)
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Share
71.4%
50.9%
100%
56.8%
93.0%
100%
Appendix 2.3
Top-Ten AAPA City Pairs 2002
Hong Kong
Kuala Lumpur
Bangkok
Bangkok
Hong Kong
Seoul
Taipei
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Taipei
Singapore
Singapore
Hong Kong
Singapore
Tokyo
Tokyo
Tokyo
Seoul
Manila
Traffic
6,527
2,909
2,690
2,517
2,232
2,214
2,079
1,933
1,847
1,774
Airlines
6
8
10
11
4
8
7
5
4
4
Distance
804
296
1,442
1,682
2,560
1,262
2,181
2,961
2,060
1,144
Time
1:40
0:55
2:20
2:55
3:45
2:20
3:10
4:10
3:25
2:00
Weekly Frequency
265
84
89
87
84
87
63
70
63
59
Load Factor
53.9%
80.3%
63.8%
59.5%
54.8%
58.1%
66.8%
56.0%
64.2%
64.4%
Traffic:
Airlines:
Distance:
Time:
Weekly Frequency:
Load Factor:
total number of passengers per day each way on AAPA airlines (includes connecting traffic)
number of airlines serving offering direct services between the city pair (AAPA and others)
distance in kilometers
scheduled block-time
weekly frequencies of AAPA airlines
load factor (using October 2003 capacity data from OAG)
sources: Reed Business Information (www.rati.com), OAG
Appendix 2.4
Airline Operating Costs
USO per ATK % of total operating costs
Cost Item NorthNrh
AmeNrca Europe Asia North Europe AsiaAmericaAmerica
Flight Crew 5.3 3.5 1.4 11.3% 6.4% 4.1%
Fuel and Oil 6.5 7.0 6.4 13.9% 12.6% 18.4%
Flight Equipment Insurance 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0% 0.1% 0.5%
Rental of Flight Equipment 2.4 3.7 3.1 5.1% 6.6% 8.8%
Flight Crew Training 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0% 0.3% 0.4%
Other Flight Expenses 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.9% 0.0% 0.7%
Maintenance and Overhaul 5.4 5.6 3.2 11.5% 10.2% 9.2%
Depreciation and Amortization 2.6 3.4 3.0 5.6% 6.1% 8.7%
Total Direct Operating Costs 22.6 23.5 17.7 48.2% 42.4% 50.8%
Airport Charges 0.7 2.4 1.3 1.5% 4.3% 3.8%
Enroute Charges 0.5 2.3 1.3 1.0% 4.2% 3.8%
Station Expenses 7.0 7.5 2.5 14.9% 13.5% 7.2%
Passenger Service 5.2 7.0 4.0 11.2% 12.7% 11.6%
Ticketing and Sales 6.6 8.5 5.0 14.1% 15.3% 14.2%
General and Administrative 2.4 4.2 1.3 5.2% 7.6% 3.7%
Other Operating Expenses 1.8 0.1 1.7 3.8% 0.1% 4.9%
Total Indirect Operating Costs 24.2 31.9 17.2 51.8% 57.6% 49.2%
Total Operating Costs 46.8 55.4 34.9 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
North America: American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, United Airlines
Europe: Air France, British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa, SAS
Asia: Japan Air Lines, Korean Air, Malaysian Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Thai Airways
source: complied using ICAO (2000) data
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Appendix 2.5
Key Socioeconomic Indicators of South-East Asian Nations
Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
Hong Kong SAR
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Income
359
265
855
23,918
450
728
38,153
9,666
322
3,848
n/a
989
23,063
2,013
399
Less Than 2 USD/Day
82.2%
no data
47.3%
no data
79.9%
55.4%
no data
no data
73.2%
9.3%
no data
46.4%
no data
32.5%
63.7%
Air Passengers
10
n/a
49
2'117
17
45
854
726
40
711
13
72
4'176
287
37
Urbanization
25%
16%
32%
100%
28%
41%
79%
82%
24%
57%
28%
59%
100%
22%
24%
Passenger Cars
0
0
1
42
2
7
283
48
6
101
no data
7
89
14
no data
Internet Users
0.1%
0.1%
1.8%
38.3%
0.5%
1.0%
37.1%
40.3%
0.1%
15.9%
0.0%
2.6%
30.0%
3.8%
0.3%
Income:
Less Than 2 USD/Day:
Air Passengers:
Urbanization:
Passenger Cars:
Internet Users:
GDP per capita in USD (2000)
percentage of population that lives on less than 2 USD per day (1990-2001)
domestic and international aircraft passengers per 1,000 residents (2000)
percentage of population living in areas defined as urban (2000)
number of passenger cars per 1,000 residents (2000)
percentage of population with access to the worldwide network (2000)
C,,
C,, source: World Development Indicators 2002 (World Bank)
Appendix 2.6
Growth in South-East Asian Nations
Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
Hong Kong SAR
India
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Laos
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Population
1.6%
1.6%
0.7%
0.6%
1.3%
1.2%
-0.1%
0.4%
2.2%
1.5%
1.0%
1.7%
1.3%
0.8%
1.5%
Income
6.1%
2.7%
7.2%
9.2%
2.0%
3.1%
2.2%
7.8%
3.3%
5.7%
Outbound Tourists
11.0%
n/a
17.2%
7.4%
5.3%
n/a
4.1%
13.4%
n/a
5.7%
n/a
2.1%
8.1%
3.5%
4.1%
n/a
4.4%
12.4%
8.0%
n/a
Int'l Travel Expenditures
10.5%
n/a
36.9%
n/a
17.7%
10.9%
2.8%
7.3%
28.2%
3.1%
1.2%
28.0%
3.8%
9.2%
n/a
Population: estimated annual population growth rate (2000 to 2015)
Income: annual growth rate of GDP per capita (1999-2000)
Outbound Tourists: annual growth rate of the departures that people make from their country of usual residence (1990-2000)
Int'l Travel Expenditures: annual growth rate of the expenditures of international outbound tourists (1990-2000)
source: World Development Indicators 2002 (World Bank)
Appendix 2.7
Key Figures of Traditional Asian Airlines
Airline
Royal Brunei
Eva Air
China Airlines
Cathay Pacific
Garuda
Japan Air Lines
Korean Airlines
Malaysia Airlines
Country PAX Revenue
Brunei Darussalam
Taiwan
Taiwan
Hong Kong SAR
Indonesia
Japan
South Korea
Malaysia
1,026
4,574
8,296
11,190
6,634
32,378
21,638
15,733
157,623
877,721
1,311,302
2,607,554
737,196
6,787,202
2,591,648
1,663,537
ASKs
5,540,465
24,564,713
33,925,694
62,790,254
24,141,000
115,633,718
55,802,220
52,594,942
RPKs
3,697,812
18,398,676
25,087,318
44,792,224
16,576,000
79,361,451
38,452,353
34,708,517
Load Yield Unit Average APH
Factor
66.7%
74.9%
73.9%
71.3%
68.7%
68.6%
68.9%
66.0%
4.26
4.77
5.23
5.82
4.45
8.55
6.74
4.79
Cost
4.15
6.30
6.02
5.67
4.02
8.25
8.21
4.02
Fare
154
192
158
233
111
210
120
106
3,604
4,022
3,024
4,003
2,499
2,451
1,777
2,206
All Nippon Airlines Japan 43,090 6,077,878 80,719,140 52,713,805 65.3% 11.53 8.94 141 1,223
Asiana Airlines South Korea 11,900 1,120,039 22,253,713 15,743,396 70.7% 7.11 7.61 94 1,323
Philippine Airlines The Philippines 5,678 681,531 19,483,460 13,491,771 69.2% 5.05 3.88 120 2,376
Qantas Airways Australia 22,681 4,699,404 90,435,809 70,312,062 77.7% 6.68 6.13 207 3,100
Singapore Airlines Singapore 14,764 3,488,664 94,558,500 69,994,500 74.0% 4.98 4.27 236 4,741
Thai Airways Thailand 18,058 2,270,598 60,458,579 45,167,123 74.7% 5.03 4.38 126 2,501
Vietnam Airlines Vietnam 3,393 383,456 7,481,683 5,575,426 74.5% 6.88 5.55 113 1,643
PAX:
Revenue:
ASKs:
RPKs:
Load Factor:
Yield:
Unit Cost:
Average Fare:
APH:
number of passengers carried (in thousands)
passenger revenue (in thousands of USD)
available seat kilometers (in thousands)
revenue passenger kilometers (in thousands)
passenger load factor (2000)
passenger yield (in US cents per RPK)
operating expenses (in US cents per ASK)
average passenger fare per segment (in USD)
average passenger haul (in kilometers)
C',
0,
sources: Reed Business Information (www.rati.com), airline annual reports, AAPA Statistical Report 2002
Appendix 2.7
Key Figures of Traditional European Airlines
PAX Revenue ASKs RPIKs Load Yield Unit Average APH
Air France
Alitalia
Austrian Airlines
British Airways
Finnair
Iberia
KLM
Lufthansa
France
Italy
Austria
United Kingdom
Finland
Spain
The Netherlands
Germany
Scandinavian Denmark/Norway! 22,896 3,433,620 34,096,200 24,170,200 70.9% 14.21 11.19 150 1,056Sweden
Swiss International Switzerland 11,316 2,465,510 31,508,200 21,828,900 69.3% 11.29 10.66 218 1,929
Air Lines
PAX:
Revenue:
ASKs:
RPKs:
Load Factor:
Yield:
Unit Cost:
Average Fare:
APH:
number of passengers carried (in thousands)
passenger revenue (in thousands of USD)
available seat kilometers (in thousands)
revenue passenger kilometers (in thousands)
passenger load factor (2000)
passenger yield (in US cents per RPK)
operating expenses (in US cents per ASK)
average passenger fare per segment (in USD)
average passenger haul (in kilometers)
sources: Reed Business Information (www.rati.com), airline annual reports, AEA Yearbook 2002
(0
CO,
Airline Country
43,421
21,861
7,070
34,009
5,838
23,888
19,956
43,915
10,535,430
3,211,100
1,957,530
10,164,620
1,426,940
3,587,250
4,766,810
9,239,790
129,469,600
41,694,700
19,561,400
136,225,900
12,933,400
55,370,700
73,813,700
121,458,700
98,508,300
29,617,600
13,794,300
99,123,200
8,462,300
40,464,300
59,181,300
93,642,600
Factor
76.1%
71.0%
70.5%
72.8%
65.4%
73.1%
80.2%
77.1%
10.69
10.84
14.19
10.25
16.86
8.87
8.05
9.87
Cost
9.66
11.30
10.78
8.43
12.06
7.64
8.97
9.28
Fare
243
147
277
299
244
150
239
210
2,269
1,355
1,951
2,915
1,450
1,694
2,966
2,132
Appendix 2.7
Key Figures of Traditional North American Airlines
Airline Country
Alaska Airlines
American Airlines
Continental Airlines
Delta Air Lines
Northwest Airlines
United Airlines
US Airways
Air Canada
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
USA
Canada
PAX Revenue
13,639
98,742
42,357
94,045
52,271
75,138
56,105
23,100
1,565,000
16,436,000
7,156,000
11,876,000
8,219,000
13,466,000
6,580,000
5,109,000
ASKs
28,770,529
296,569,271
130,499,554
227,327,565
158,221,015
265,116,539
107,288,120
91,297,878
RPKs
19,676,461
204,191,754
94,435,428
157,044,836
117,635,599
187,604,573
73,906,197
66,765,455
Load Yield
Factor
68.4%
68.9%
72.4%
69.1%
74.3%
70.8%
68.9%
73.1%
7.95
8.05
7.58
7.56
6.99
7.18
8.90
7.65
Unit Average
Cost Fare
6.35 115
7.19 166
6.37 169
6.24 126
6.57 157
7.48 179
8.79 117
7.13 221
PAX:
Revenue:
ASKs:
RPKs:
Load Factor:
Yield:
Unit Cost:
Average Fare:
APH:
number of passengers carried (in thousands)
passenger revenue (in thousands of USD)
available seat kilometers (in thousands)
revenue passenger kilometers (in thousands)
passenger load factor (2000)
passenger yield (in US cents per RPK)
operating expenses (in US cents per ASK)
average passenger fare per segment (in USD)
average passenger haul (in kilometers)
sources: Reed Business Information (www.rati.com), airline annual reports, AEA Annual Report 2002
APH
1,443
2,068
2,230
1,670
2,250
2,497
1,317
2,890
Appendix 2.7
Key Figures of Traditional Airlines in Other Parts of the World
Airline Country
South African South Africa
PAX Revenue ASKs RPKs
6,360 1,436,370 30,913,420 21,276,930
Load
Factor
68.8%
Yield Unit
Cost
6.75 5.70
Average
Fare
APH
226 3,345
Emirates United Arab 8,500 1,882,760 41,336,550 31,660,550 76.6% 5.95 5.67 222 3,725Emirates
Aeroflot Russia 5,500 1,100,800 25,370,200 17,645,200 69.6% 6.24 5.36 200 3,208
Varig Brazil 9,700 1,492,035 38,085,240 26,115,300 68.6% 5.71 7.49 154 2,692
Air China People's Republic 10,590 1,563,280 35,158,000 24,002,300 68.3% 6.51 4.85 148 2,267
of China
Aeromexico Mexico 8,800 1,247,700 20,534,280 13,307,600 64.8% 9.38 6.79 142 1,512
PAX:
Revenue:
ASKs:
RPKs:
Load Factor:
Yield:
Unit Cost:
Average Fare:
APH:
number of passengers carried (in thousands)
passenger revenue (in thousands of USD)
available seat kilometers (in thousands)
revenue passenger kilometers (in thousands)
passenger load factor (2000)
passenger yield (in US cents per RPK)
operating expenses (in US cents per ASK)
average passenger fare per segment (in USD)
average passenger haul (in kilometers)
sources: Reed Business Information (www.rati.com), airline annual reports, AEA Annual Report 2002
00
coV-
Appendix 2.8
GDP and Air Passenger Growth
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